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Abstract 
 
This thesis first examines the underlying theories of the statutory models of Nigerian and 
Canadian company law, in order to determine the impact of these differing models on 
minority shareholders’ protection in each jurisdiction. From a practical perspective, this 
thesis then undertakes a comparative analysis of minority shareholders’ protections in the 
respective corporate statutes along with the judicial interpretations provided by the 
Nigerian and Canadian courts, with particular reference to the derivative action and 
oppression remedy. The similarities and differences between the derivative action and 
oppression remedy action available in each jurisdiction are highlighted, thereby revealing 
certain areas of convergence and other areas of jurisdictional uniqueness. 
Minority shareholders may be more willing to invest in jurisdictions where their status as 
minority shareholders will not place them in a precarious situation. Consequently, this 
thesis examines the extent to which minority shareholders’ protection can influence 
dispersed investments in a developing economy like Nigeria. Concluding that there is a 
plausible link between minority shareholders’ protection and dispersed investments, this 
thesis recommends more adequate provisions and mechanisms to protect minority 
shareholders so as to improve the extent of investments especially in a developing country 
like Nigeria.  
Keywords: corporation, company, majority rule, corporate legal personality, derivative 
action, oppression remedy, shareholder, complainant, applicant. 
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Lay Summary 
This thesis conducts a comparative analysis of minority shareholders' protection available 
under Nigerian and Canadian corporate law. It specifically addresses the statutory 
provisions provided to remedy wrongs done to the corporations and to individual 
shareholders under both jurisdictions. It argues that although the Canadian and Nigerian 
corporate law evolved majorly from the English Acts, the Canadian statutory provisions 
and interpretations provided by the Canadian courts have evolved to a higher level of 
sophistication by providing more detail and flexibility that gives more adequate protection 
for shareholders compared to the Nigerian corporate legal system. It also highlights the 
different enforcement patterns in Nigeria that may negatively impact minority shareholders 
in Nigerian corporations. 
This thesis further draws the link between minority shareholders' protection and dispersed 
investments and argues that strong minority shareholders' protection facilitates dispersed 
investments which could help in economic development. Therefore, this thesis 
recommends more adequate provisions and mechanisms to protect minority shareholders 
so as to improve the extent of investments especially in a developing country like Nigeria.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Democratic principles1 have become entrenched in many institutions across the world and 
the corporate environment is not an exception.  These democratic principles have been 
embedded into the corporate environment in most jurisdictions through the principle of 
“majority rule”.2  Further to these democratic principles, corporations are ordinarily 
governed in accordance with the will of the majority shareholders of the company or of the 
majority of members of the board of directors as the case may be.3 Although democracy in 
politics, i.e. one person- one vote and representatives elected by majority vote, is still not 
a perfect system, it is one of the least problematic and most preferred modes of 
governance.4 However, when one transplants the ideals of democracy into the corporate 
environment, unfortunately, it takes on a different hue.  
 
The sacrosanct one person, one vote principle does not ordinarily apply in a corporate 
environment. What applies in most instances where a decision is to be taken by the 
shareholders is a voting system dependent on the number of shares an individual or 
organization owns,5i.e. one share one vote.  It is not uncommon to see situations where the 
majority of the votes are concentrated in the hands of a few shareholders. In such situations, 
the few shareholders, though they do not constitute the “majority” in number, nevertheless 
may be the dominant shareholders based on the number of shares they hold in the 
corporation. This creates an interesting paradox as the physical majority could be the 
                                                          
1Democratic principles prescribe that decision-making is undertaken by the majority of persons in any given 
group. 
2Majority rule is also known as the principle of shareholder democracy. This rule was established in Foss v 
Harbottle [1843] 67 ER 189, which provides that where a wrong is done to a corporation, the proper plaintiff 
is the corporation itself, and where such wrong can be ratified by the majority of shareholders in a general 
meeting, the court will not interfere.  
3 Generally, all powers of a company are to be exercised by one or other of its own organs: the shareholders 
in the general meetings or the board of directors. 
4Larry Diamond, “The Democratic Rollback – The Resurgence of the Predatory State” (2008) 87:2 Foreign 
Aff. 39 at 41. 
5Cumulative voting may be used in arriving at certain decisions. See Section 107 of the Canada Business 
Corporations Act, RSC 1985, c. C-44 and Section 224 of the Companies and Allied Matters Act, Laws of the 
Federation of Nigeria, 2004. 
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minority shareholders while the physical minority could be the dominant shareholders in a 
company - the very antithesis of political democracy.6 
 
While this situation itself is not an absurdity, where for instance both the objectives of the 
holders of the majority and minority shares in the company are aligned, completely 
different dynamics are manifest when there is a misalignment of objectives between these 
shareholders, particularly in situations where the dominant shareholders are acting in their 
own interests but not necessarily in the best interests of the company. It even becomes more 
complicated where an alleged wrong to the company or the majority (in number, though 
not in voting rights) of the shareholders is an act which the dominant shareholders are 
legally entitled to do or at least, entitled to ratify.7 In such situations, the shareholders with 
a minority of voting rights could be helpless and the only viable remedy may be to exit the 
company. Consequently, majority rule in the corporate context was identical with the Wall 
Street rule that shareholders who are dissatisfied with the policies of the corporation should 
sell their shares.8 In order to remedy this helplessness, minority shareholders' protection 
laws have been enacted in many jurisdictions across the world. 
 
Minority shareholders’ protections are mechanisms put in place to shield or remedy 
shareholders from abuse of their rights, especially as they do not hold enough shares to 
exercise control over the decisions made by the corporation that could have resulted in such 
abuse. While there are many mechanisms that can be put in place to protect the interests of 
minority shareholders ranging from social to economic to political or legal, this thesis will 
focus on legal protections available under Canadian9 and Nigerian corporate law, 
specifically the derivative action and oppression remedy. It is important to note that the 
application and scope of the derivative action and oppression remedy are influenced greatly 
by the nature of the corporation and the closeness of the relationships between the 
stakeholders of the corporation. In other words, these remedies are likely to be particularly 
                                                          
6“Physical majority” and “physical minority” in this sense, refers to the number of the shareholders as 
opposed to the number of shares held by the shareholders. 
7 SH Goo, Minority Shareholders Protection (London: Cavendish Publishing Limited, 1994) at 2. 
8
Brett McDonnel, “Setting Optimal Rules for Shareholder Proxy Access” (2011) 43 Ariz.St. L.J 67 at 75. 
9 This thesis will focus on the federal business corporation act, i.e. the CBCA. Further reference to “Canadian 
corporate law”, unless specified otherwise, means the CBCA. 
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important in circumstances where shareholders cannot effectively monitor the operations 
of the directors and management of the corporation.  
 
The primary law regulating companies and shareholders protection in Nigeria is the 
Companies and Allied Matters Act (“CAMA”).10 Due to the colonial history of Nigeria and 
Britain, the substantive provisions of the CAMA are derived largely from the UK 
Companies Act of 1948 and principles from a number of English judicial decisions. 
Canadian corporate law, on the other hand, is governed by the federal statute –the Canada 
Business Corporations Act (“CBCA”)11 and other corporate law statutes which regulate 
corporate law in each province and territory of Canada.12Although the English Common 
Law is the common foundation of both Nigeria and Canada, Canadian company law has 
evolved and has over the years reached a much higher level of sophistication compared to 
Nigerian company law and practice, which will be highlighted in this thesis.  
 
This thesis aims to provide an insightful and comparative perspective on the extent to 
which minority shareholders’ protection under Canadian and Nigerian company law really 
does protect minority shareholders. This thesis will carve out the restrictions placed on 
some of these minority shareholder protection provisions, which may be obstacles to the 
adequate protection for minority shareholders of the corporation. It will further identify 
research highlighting the extent to which minority shareholders’ protection can facilitate 
dispersed investments in an economy. This thesis will then provide recommendations in 
relation to legislative amendments, as well as the institutional expertise required to 
implement these “legislative amendments” which may, in turn, promote investments in 
Nigeria.   
 
                                                          
10 Cap C20, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004. 
11RSC 1985, c. C-44 
12 These provincial and territorial statutes are – Ontario Business Corporations Act 1982 SO c4, Manitoba 
Corporations Act SM 1976 c40, Saskatchewan Business Corporations Act RSS 1978 CB10, Alberta Business 
Corporations Act 1981 cB15, New Brunswick Business Corporations Act SNB 1981 Cb9.1, Yukon Business 
Corporations Act RSY 1986 c15, British Columbia Business Corporations Act RSBC 1996, Quebec, 
Business Corporations Act 2011, Prince Edward Island Business Corporations Act 2018, Nova Scotia 
Companies Act 1989 R.S, c. 101, s.1, Northwest Territories Business Corporations Act 1996, c.19, Nunavut 
Business Corporations Act,1998 SI 005-98, and Newfoundland Corporations Act SN 1986 c12. 
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This thesis is set out in five chapters: 
Chapter 1: Distinction between Company and Corporation and Historical Development of 
Nigerian and Canadian corporate law. Under the Nigerian corporate legal system, the term 
“corporation” is frequently associated with government enterprises rather than private 
sector entities while under the CBCA this is not the case. This chapter points out that the 
term “corporation” as used under the CBCA and the term “company” as commonly used in 
Nigeria have the same conventional meaning. Chapter 1 identifies the legislative models 
underlying Canadian and Nigerian corporate law and concludes that both models have 
similar impact within the context of minority shareholders protection in their respective 
jurisdictions. Chapter 1 further sets out a brief background of the principles of corporate 
legal personality and majority rule, in order to appreciate the importance of minority 
shareholders’ protection in both jurisdictions.  
Chapter 2: Comparative Analysis of Derivative Action under Nigerian and Canadian 
Company Law. This chapter provides a detailed comparison between the derivative action 
provisions available under the CAMA and the CBCA. This chapter further examines the 
attitude of the Nigerian and Canadian courts in interpreting derivative action provisions. 
Chapter 3: Comparative Analysis of the Oppression Remedy under Nigerian and Canadian 
Company Law. This chapter identifies the oppression remedy as one of the strongest tools 
for minority shareholders in modern corporate law practice. It sets out a comparative 
analysis of the oppression remedy provisions available under Nigerian and Canadian law 
as well as the tests that have been pronounced and used by the Canadian courts, which are 
not available under the Nigerian corporate legal system. 
Chapter 4: Solving the Predicament. This chapter summarizes the differences between the 
CAMA and CBCA derivative action and oppression remedy provisions. It reveals that there 
are not many significant differences, and argues that the Nigerian minority shareholders 
nevertheless enjoy lesser protection than Canadian minority shareholders because of the 
lack of adequate enforcement. This chapter highlights the various enforcement patterns in 
Nigeria that may hinder adequate protection of minority shareholders’ rights in Nigerian 
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corporations. This chapter further highlights the correlation between strong investor 
protection and dispersed shareholdings in an economy. 
Chapter 5: Conclusion. 
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Chapter 1: Distinction between Company and Corporation 
1. Introduction 
 
The words “company” and “corporation” are used interchangeably in different parts of the 
world.13In some jurisdictions, corporate statutes specifically use the term “company”, while 
others use the term “corporation”. For instance, Nigeria’s corporate law statute uses the 
term “company” while Canada’s federal corporate law statute, the CBCA,14 uses the term 
“corporation”. However, in Nigeria, the term “corporation” is frequently associated with 
government-owned entities, while in Canada, the term “corporation” as used in the CBCA 
has the same conventional meaning as “company” under the CAMA, i.e., an incorporated 
entity set up by individuals for the purpose of carrying on business. This chapter identifies 
that the Nigerian company law statute operates under a contractarian model, while the 
CBCA operates under a division of powers model. This chapter further highlights the 
fundamental attributes of the contractarian and division of powers models, in order to 
determine whether the underlying theories of these models have an effect on minority 
shareholders’ protections. Chapter 1 further reveals that there is not a significant practical 
difference between both models such as to render a comparison between them unrealistic.  
Finally, chapter 1 examines the background of corporate legal personality and majority 
rule, in order to appreciate the importance of minority shareholders’ protection under both 
jurisdictions 
1.1. Company vs. Corporation 
 
As highlighted in the introductory section, the Nigerian corporate legal system is an 
offshoot of the English Common law,15 and its corporate legislation also uses the term 
“company” just as in the United Kingdom. Under the English common law, the word 
                                                          
13Christopher C Nicholls, Corporate law (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 2005) [Nicholls] at 5. 
14 By “Canadian statute”, I mean the CBCA. The reason this thesis will be focusing on the CBCA will be 
discussed later in this chapter. 
15Although most Canadian corporate statutes no longer refer to their incorporated business organizations as 
“companies”, the Nova Scotia statute is still called the Companies Act and was largely based on an early 
version of the English Companies Act.  
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“company” has no strict legal meaning.16Historically, the word connotes an association of 
persons who come together for a common purpose or objective.17In the conventional sense, 
the word “company” is used when referring to a group of people associated together for 
the purpose of obtaining an economic benefit like carrying on a business for profit.18In 
recent times, these “groups of people” would typically solidify their relationship by 
incorporating a company under the Act for the purpose of carrying on a business, and in 
order to identify the specific duties and powers of members of the company. 
 
Under the Nigerian legal system, the term “corporation” is frequently associated with 
government-owned enterprises rather than private sector entities. Although there is no legal 
reason why the term “corporation” is frequently ascribed to government enterprises, the 
correlation may have arisen from the fact that the names of some government-owned 
enterprises usually end with the term “corporation”.19 However, this is not the case under 
the CBCA where the term “corporation” is used for all for-profit bodies corporate that are 
incorporated under the statute. The term “corporation” is used more generally to connote a 
body that may be incorporated for-profit, non-profit, ecclesiastical or charitable 
purposes.20Just like the word “company”, the word “corporation” is frequently used in a 
conventional sense to mean “one particular species of a body corporate that exists to earn 
profits: the business corporation”.21 It is pertinent to note that the terms “company” as used 
under CAMA and “corporation” as used under the CBCA have the same functional meaning 
as they both refer to business organizations incorporated by one or more incorporators. 22 
Having established the terms “corporation” and “company” are used to connote business 
organizations and are not materially different especially in their usage in recent times, the 
following sub-section will identify the legislative models underlying Nigerian and 
                                                          
16Re Stanley [1906] 1 Ch. 131 at 134, Buckley J. 
17PL Davies, Daniel Prentice & LCB Gower, Gower’s principles of modern company law, 6th ed (London: 
Sweet & Maxwell, 1997) at 3. 
18Ibid. 
19 For example, the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation, Nigerian Railway Corporation, etc.19 
20Nicholls, supra note 13 at 2. 
21Ibid at 6. Citing Frank Evans, “What is a Company?” (1910) 26 Law Quarterly Review 259 at 260. 
22 For the purpose of consistency, the term “corporation” will be used throughout this thesis.  
8 
 
 
Canadian corporate law in the context of minority shareholders’ protection in order to also 
determine whether further comparison between both provisions in the statutes is realistic. 
1.2. Contractarian and Division of Powers Models in the context of Minority 
Shareholders’ Protection 
 
A contractarian company is generally known as an “English Model Company” or 
“Memorandum and Articles of Association” company”.23 This is the model of companies 
that characterizes the UK Companies Act, CAMA and the Canadian corporate statutes that 
were originally based on the UK model.24 The contractarian model is premised on the 
theory that the company’s constitutional documents constitute a contract between the 
company and its members and between the members and officers of the company. 25 This 
contractual relationship is established by specific provisions in the corporate statutes 
regulating companies in these contractarian jurisdictions.26The current corporate statute in 
Nigeria - CAMA27- still retains the position that the Memorandum and Articles of 
Association is the governing document for this type of company and forms a contract 
between the company and its members and between the members and officers themselves.28 
 
Furthermore, contractarian companies may be in various forms. CAMA provides that a 
contractarian company could be an unlimited company, a company limited by guarantee 
or a company limited by shares,29 which may be public or private in nature. This thesis will 
focus on companies limited by shares because it is the most usual form of company under 
CAMA30 that attracts the most investors because of its limited liability feature.31In other 
words, the liability of the shareholders does not fluctuate but is limited to the extent of the 
                                                          
23Bruce Welling, Corporate law in Canada (London: Scribblers Pub, 2006) at 114. 
24Nicholls, supra note 13 at 10. 
25Ibid. 
26For example, Section 41 of the Companies and Allied Matters Act, C20, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 
2004 sets out this contractual orientation. 
27 Cap C20, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004. 
28 Section 41 of the CAMA. 
29 Section 21 of CAMA. 
30 Alfred F Topham & E R Hardy Ivamy, Topham and Ivamy’s Company law (London: Butterworth, 1978) 
at 3. 
31Manjeet Sahu, Classification of Companies, (2012) SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 2191869, Social Science 
Research Network at 3. 
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unpaid value of their respective shares.32 During the existence of the company or in the 
event of winding up, a member can be called upon to pay the amount remaining unpaid on 
the shares subscribed by the shareholder.33 
 
In view of the shareholding structure and limited liability feature, the company limited by 
shares is best suited for the assessment of shareholders protection, particularly minority 
shareholders, as investors are more willing to make investments in companies where their 
liability is limited. The CBCA, on the other hand, operates under the Division of Powers 
model which is the most common type of corporation under Canadian corporate law.34Just 
as the name suggests, the division of power statutes expressly divide powers between the 
shareholders and management of the corporation,35 subject in certain cases, to the 
provisions of a statutorily recognized agreement called a unanimous shareholder 
agreement.36 
 
There are two fundamental attributes of both models that will likely have an impact on 
minority shareholders’ protection. First, a division of powers model clearly sets out the 
powers and obligations of directors, officers, shareholders and perhaps creditors in the 
incorporating statute. For instance, a division of powers statute usually has a section 
empowering the directors to manage or supervise the management of the affairs and 
business of the corporation, subject to any unanimous shareholder agreement.37 While the 
“division of powers” attribute is not one originally found in the contractarian model, many 
contractarian corporate statutes have adopted this feature as a “default” position and have 
now set out powers and obligations of directors and shareholders in the incorporating 
statute.  For example, Section 63 of the CAMA38 statutorily empowers directors of a 
company to manage the business of the company, subject to the provisions of the articles 
of association of the company.  
                                                          
32Ibid.  
33 Section 27 (3) (b) of CAMA. 
34Nicholls, supra note 13 at 40. 
35 See section 102 (1) CBCA. 
36 See section 102 (1) CBCA. 
37 See section 102 (1) CBCA. 
38 Cap C20, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004. 
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Second, a division of powers model takes on a remedy-oriented approach while the 
contractarian model takes on a contractual and rights-oriented approach.39This means that 
the division of powers model clearly provides for the status of key individuals in the 
corporation like the shareholders, and sets out remedies for shareholders where their rights 
have been abused. All the remedies under a division of powers model are statutory, while 
the contractarian model is historically associated with contractual remedies whereby 
shareholders can sue for breach of contract where their rights have been abused. In recent 
times, many contractarian models have also adopted statutory remedies similar to those 
provided in the division of powers model in order to protect minority shareholders from 
any breach resulting from an abuse of power granted to persons under the statute.40 
 
It is pertinent to note that majority rule is the fundamental principle upon which the division 
of powers statutes operate41 whereby the statutory powers outlined in the statutes are 
expected to be performed by the majority of each body in the corporation – the board of 
directors and shareholders as the case may be.42 However, the statute attempts to address 
the excesses that the application of the majority rule may cause by creating extensive 
remedies for minority shareholders and other complainants43. Thus, the division of powers 
model makes provision for statutory remedies in the event that the statutory powers 
provided in the constitution have been misused in some way. The importance attached to 
minority shareholders protection in this type of corporate constitution can be seen, for 
example in Section 247 of the CBCA which provides that a “complainant”44 or creditor of 
the corporation may apply to the court for an order directing a person to comply with, or 
restrain from committing future breaches of the Act, regulations, articles, by-laws, or a 
                                                          
39Welling, supra note 23 at 59. 
40 For example, the CAMA sets out minority shareholders’ protection which will be assessed in chapter 2& 3 
of this thesis. 
41Welling, supra note 23 at 62. 
42 Although, there are some instances in which a two-third majority vote of shareholders is required rather 
than merely a simple majority. 
43Welling, supra note 23 at 62. 
44For the purposes of section 247 of the CBCA, a “complainant” is a shareholder or former shareholder of the 
company, or any of its affiliates, a director or an officer or former director or officer of the company, or any 
of its affiliates, the CBCA Director or any other person who, in the discretion of a court is a proper party. 
11 
 
 
unanimous shareholder agreement. This statutory provision provides shareholders with 
access to judicial remedies wherever a breach of the corporate constitution occurs without 
regard to the seriousness of the alleged breach.45 
 
A unique feature of the contractarian model is that the statute invariably establishes a 
contractual relationship among the shareholders, and between the company and each 
shareholder.46This simply implies that any breach of the corporate constitution, i.e. the 
Memorandum and Articles of Association, can be redressed by an action instituted for 
breach of contract in the courts.47 Thus, in addition to the statutory minority protections, 
the contractarian model also provides for contractual remedies where the provisions of the 
Memorandum and Articles have been breached. While this may appear to suggest that the 
contractarian model affords minority shareholders a plethora of remedies – statutory and 
contractual - the contractual remedy may not necessarily be adequate protection for 
minority shareholders in the company. This is because a voting process is usually required 
to amend and set out the contractual terms in the Memorandum and Articles of the 
company, and depending on the corporate constitution, the shares may be divided into 
distinct classes, with each class conferring different powers and rights to the shareholders. 
Some shares may carry voting rights, while others may not.48 A few individuals may hold 
enough “voting” shares to cast sufficient votes to determine the provisions of the 
Memorandum and Articles of Association and how the corporation will be 
run.49Consequently, an action for a breach of contract will more likely be geared towards 
protecting the rights of the “majority” whose “voting shares” influenced the provisions of 
the corporate constitution rather than the rights of minority shareholders. Where the votes 
of the minority shareholders and majority shareholders are aligned with regard to the 
provisions of the Memorandum and Articles, an action for a breach of contract may then 
protect the rights of the minority shareholders. 
 
                                                          
45Welling, supra note 23 at 64. 
46Ibid at 65. 
47Ibid. 
48Ibid at 61. 
49Ibid. 
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From the above, it is clear that both models have their distinctive features; however, the 
CAMA has adopted many of the distinct features of the division of powers models, and so 
has similar provisions with the CBCA, which is a division of powers model. The only 
distinct feature of the contractarian statutes, i.e., the contractual relationship between the 
members of the corporation and officers of the company incorporated under CAMA, has no 
significant impact per se on minority shareholders’ protection in a corporation. Therefore, 
a comparative analysis of the statutory provisions of the CAMA and the CBCA is 
appropriate and useful, especially because the underlying structure of each statute is very 
similar and as such, any recommendations for improvement may be easily effected in both 
jurisdictions.  
1.3. Brief Background of Minority Shareholders’ Protection 
 
As noted in the introductory section of this thesis, the need for remedies for minority 
shareholders protection arose to mitigate the effects of the strict application of the corporate 
legal personality principle and majority rule. This section will give a brief background of 
minority shareholders’ protection, i.e. the corporate legal personality rule and rule in Foss 
v Harbottle, as well as examine the relevance of the rule in modern corporate practice 
within the respective jurisdictions, so as to underscore the importance of minority 
shareholder protection. 
1.3.1. Corporate Legal Personality of the Corporation 
 
It is almost impossible to discuss majority rule without first reflecting on the cardinal 
principle of company law, that is, the corporate legal personality rules. No doubt, the 
relevance of the separate legal personality principle in company law and practice as laid 
out in the locus classicus case of Salomon v Salomon and Co Ltd50cannot be 
overemphasized. The case of Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd has been famously described 
by Lord Templeman as the “unyielding rock of English company law”51 while others have 
                                                          
50 [1897] AC 22. 
51Lord Templeman, “Company law lecture – forty years on” (1990) 11:1Company Lawyer 10 at 10.  
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described it as a key principle of company law,52 and have hailed it as making possible “the 
industrial and commercial developments which have occurred throughout the world”.53 
The legal personality principle is simply to the effect that the moment a company is 
incorporated it assumes the status of a legal person capable of carrying out actions and 
taking decisions in its own name as a natural person would. This theory is codified in both 
the CBCA and CAMA54and has been reiterated by the Nigerian and Canadian courts in a 
number of cases.55 
A clear understanding of the legal personality principle of the corporation and the 
implications of a company assuming the status of incorporation is a prerequisite for an 
adequate grasp of the principle established in the English case of Foss v Harbottle56 which 
forms part of the Nigerian corporate jurisprudence.57 The rule in Foss v Harbottle is said 
to have arisen “inevitably from the doctrine of separate legal personality”,58 as suggested 
by the Supreme Court of Canada,59citing a passage from the English Court of Appeal’s 
judgment in Prudential Assurance co. v Newman Industries Ltd,60 in which the court 
declared the Foss v Harbottle rule to be “the consequence of the fact that a corporation is 
a separate legal entity”.61  More recently, the Ontario Court of Appeal62 expressly linked 
the logic underlying the rule in Foss v Harbottle with that of the celebrated Salomon 
principle:  
The rule in Foss v. Harbottle provides simply that a shareholder of a 
corporation – even a controlling shareholder or the sole shareholder – does 
not have a personal cause of action for a wrong done to the corporation. The 
                                                          
52 Lord Cooke of Thorndon, A Real Thing in Turning Points of the Common Law (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 
1997) at 8. 
53 Ibid at 11. 
54 See Section 15 of the CBCA and Section 37 of CAMA. 
55 See Emenite Ltd v Oleke [2005] 6 NWLR (Pt. 921) 350; Kosmopoulous v Constitution Insurance Co. of 
Canada [1987] 1 S.C.R 2. 
56[1843] 2 Hare 461. 
57Charles Onyehinim Eluromma, Majority rule and minority protection in private corporations : a 
comparative appraisal of the problems and remedies under the Canadian and Nigerian jurisdictions 
University of British Columbia, 2014) at 42. 
58Nicholls, supra note 13 at 391. 
59Hercules Management Ltd v. Ernst & Young [1997] 2 SCR 165 at 211-212. 
60 [1982] 1 ALL ER 354 at 367. 
61Ibid.  
62Meditrust Healthcare Inc. v Shoppers Drug Mart (2002) 61 OR (3d) 786at 790 (CA). 
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rule respects a basic principle of corporate law: a corporation has a legal 
existence separate from that of its shareholders. 
 
1.3.2. The Rule in Foss v Harbottle 
 
The rule in Foss v Harbottle, an elementary principle of corporate law63 laid down in the 
case of Foss v Harbottle, propounds that the court will not interfere with the internal 
management of companies acting within their powers, and in fact, has no jurisdiction to do 
so. As companies enjoy legal personality, they can assert rights of their own and could 
institute an action to redress any wrong to recover moneys or damages alleged to be due to 
the company, and such actions should prima facie be brought by the company itself.64 
In the case Edwards v Halliwell,65 the Court provided a comprehensive list of exceptions 
to the Rule in Foss v Harbottle: 
i. where the action involved an illegal act or an act ultra vires the corporation;  
ii. where the action was not one that could be sanctioned by a simple majority 
of the company’s members, but required, instead, the approval of some 
special majority vote; 
iii. where the act gave rise to a personal right of action on the part of the 
individual plaintiff; and  
iv. where the act constituted a fraud on the minority.66 
 
These exceptions suggest that the shareholder can obtain redress for a wrong in certain 
circumstances. However, Wedderburn asserts that the exceptions are not real exceptions, 
except for in cases of fraud,67 as they appear to be applicable only in situations in which 
there is no chance of confirmation by the majority, and in such cases, the Rule cannot apply 
in any event.68 
                                                          
63Burland v Earle [1902] AC 83 at para 10, Lord Davey. 
64KW Wedderburn, “Shareholders’ Rights and the Rule in Foss v. Harbottle” (1957) 15:2 The Cambridge 
Law Journal 194 at 195. 
65 [1950] 2 ALL ER 1064 (CA).  
66Ibid at 1067. 
67Wedderburn, supra note 64 at 208. 
68Ibid. 
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1.4. The Relevance of the Rule 
 
Under Nigerian company law, the Rule and its exceptions have been codified in Section 
299 and 300 of the CAMA respectively. Section 299 provides as follows: 
Subject to the provisions of this Act, where an irregularity has been committed 
in the course of the company’s affairs or any wrong done to the company, only 
the company can sue to remedy that wrong and only the company can rectify 
the irregular conduct. 
 
In addition to the above exceptions set out in Edwards v Halliwell,69CAMA also provides 
for other instances where the Rule will not apply. For instance, the rule will not apply where 
a company meeting cannot be called in time70or where the directors are likely to derive a 
profit or benefit or have profited or benefited from their negligence or from their breach of 
duty.71Both sections 299 and 300 of CAMA have been re-affirmed by the Nigerian courts 
on many occasions.72The Rule has been applied not only to incorporated bodies but also to 
unincorporated associations.73 It was applied to trade unions in Cotter v National Union of 
Seamen74and Mbene v Ofili,75 on the ground that a union was a body possessing a 
constitution or a set of rules prescribing the grievance procedure and also entitling it to sue 
and be sued as a legal entity. 
 
In Elufioye v Halilu76 concerns were raised as to whether a rule of law such as that in Foss 
v Harbottle, which technically strips the court of jurisdiction to grant remedies, and bars 
minority shareholders of a corporation or association from addressing wrongs done to the 
company and enforcing their rights were not contrary to the provisions of section 6(6) (b) 
of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1979.77The Constitution provides 
that the judicial powers vested in the courts by section 6 (6) (b):  
                                                          
69 [1950] 2 ALL ER 1064 (CA).  
70 Section 300 (e) CAMA. 
71 Section 300 (f) CAMA. 
72Adenuga v Odumeru [2002] 8 NWLR 163 at p. 169. 
73The Nigerian courts have followed the decision in the case of Edwards v Halliwell. In this case, the  courts 
applied the rule in Foss v Harbottle in disputes arising in a trade organisation.  
74 [1929] 2 Ch. 58. 
75 [1968] NCLR 293. 
76 [1993] 6 NWLR 570. 
77 Ibid at 599. 
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shall extend to all matters between persons, or between government or 
authority and to any persons in Nigeria, and to all actions and proceedings 
relating thereto, for the determination of any question as to the civil rights and 
obligations of that person.   
 
That is to say, one of the questions for determination before the court was whether a ruling 
preventing the court from interfering with the affairs of the company where the action to 
redress the wrong is brought by minority members and the wrong is ratifiable by a simple 
majority of members, would not be contrary to the provisions of Section 6(6) (b) of the 
constitution that empowers the court to decide on all matters relating to the civil rights and 
obligations of persons in Nigeria. The Supreme Court78clarified this by stating that the rule 
in Foss v Harbottle will not apply to exclude a person who can establish a personal right 
that is distinct from that of the business of the association or company. In other words, the 
court will not exclude a person from bringing an application for an injunction or declaration 
with respect to any act or omission affecting the applicant’s individual rights as a member 
or an action to obtain an oppression remedy.79 The implication of this is that where an 
individual membership right is alleged to be violated, the court will, pursuant to its general 
jurisdiction conferred upon it by section 6(6) (b) of the Constitution, intervene to grant 
appropriate remedies at the instance of the minority shareholder, whereas in cases where 
the alleged act is done to the company, such acts being capable of  ratification by a simple 
majority of members, the court will, in accordance with the rule in Foss v Harbottle, decline 
assistance to the minority shareholder.80 
 
The court’s policy of not interfering in the internal affairs of the corporation to grant relief 
to minority shareholders, where the alleged wrong is one affecting the corporate 
membership rights and not shareholders’ personal rights is a fundamental problem for 
minority shareholders’ protection under Nigerian law for two reasons. First, there is a thin 
line between personal rights and corporate rights of a minority shareholder in a company. 
Personal rights are attached to the status of membership in a corporation and are usually 
                                                          
78Ibid at 599 at para E. 
79 This is in line with the third exception set out in the case of Edwards v Halliwell [1950] 2 All ER 1064, 
which is now also codified in section 300 (C) of the CAMA. 
80Eluromma, supra note 57 at 57. 
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provided in the articles or statute,81 while corporate membership rights are rights exercised 
by a number of individual members acting in co-operation for instance, by resolution.82 
There is a possibility that some corporate membership rights affect the personal rights of 
the shareholders, and the court’s refusal to intervene may be prejudicial to such individual 
rights. The Supreme Court of Nigeria has identified the difficulty in effectively drawing a 
clear distinction between a personal and a corporate right of a shareholder. In Globe 
Fishing Industries Ltd v Coker,83 the Supreme Court, per Olatawura JSC, remarked as 
follows:  
The dividing line between personal and corporate right is very hard to draw, 
and perhaps the most that can be said is that the court will incline to treat a 
provision in the Memorandum or Articles as conferring a personal right on a 
member only if he has an interest in its observance distinct from the general 
interest which every member has in the company adhering to the terms of its 
constitution. 
 
Second, the basis upon which the rule in Foss v Harbottle was decided does not occur in 
modern-day corporate law practice. In Foss v Harbottle where the court pronounced the 
majority rule, it is pertinent to note that the corporate constitution (that is, the special act 
of Parliament) of the Victoria Park Company in that case, empowered the shareholders in 
a general meeting to decide whether to commence legal proceedings84 and this power 
ascribed to the shareholders was the basis upon which the decision in Foss v Harbottle was 
reached.85 But typically in modern corporations, it is usually the responsibility of the 
directors and not the shareholders to decide whether or not a corporation should pursue 
legal action (although under Canadian law, a unanimous shareholders agreement could be 
put in place to vest the directors’ managerial powers in the shareholders).86 Thus, unlike 
the situation in Foss v Harbottle, “there is no means whereby a majority of the shareholders 
in a modern corporation can authorize an action in the corporate name on behalf of the 
                                                          
81J Olakunle Orojo, Company Law and Practice in Nigeria (Johannesburg: LexisNexis, 2008) at 82. 
82Eluromma, supra note 57 at 52. 
83[1990] 7 NWLR (pt. 162) at 265. 
84Nicholls, supra note 13 at 396. 
85Ibid. 
86 See Section 102 of the CBCA. The ability to limit the powers of the directors through a unanimous 
agreement is not available under the Nigerian company law. Under CAMA, some powers of the directors are 
statutory based, while some are usually set out in the articles of association. Shareholders can only interfere 
by amending the articles.  
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company against the wishes of the board of directors”.87 In other words, since the 
shareholders are not the body empowered to decide whether a legal action is brought in the 
name of the company, it is then predictable that minority shareholders will turn to the court 
for a remedy especially where the directors do not institute the action. Where the courts 
then refuse on the basis that it is the company that should sue (which is in reality a decision 
made by the directors), this may lead to prejudice to the rights of the minority shareholder.  
 
It can, however, be argued that since Section 299 is made subject to other provisions of the 
CAMA, which set out instances where a member of a company can institute legal action on 
behalf of the company, it renders the Rule irrelevant and questions its applicability in 
modern-day corporations. The question that arises is – why is the rule still retained in the 
CAMA considering its irrelevance in modern-day corporations, and in view of the other 
provisions of the CAMA? Specifically, the CAMA provides for a derivative action which 
allows a member to institute or defend an action on behalf of a company to remedy a wrong 
done to the company, subject to obtaining leave from the court.  
 
With respect to the application of the Rule under Canadian company law, the Supreme 
Court in Hercules Management Ltd v Ernst & Young88 averted to the Rule in Foss v 
Harbottle stating that individual shareholders have no cause of action in law for any wrongs 
done to the corporation and that if an action is to be brought in respect of such losses, it 
must be brought either by the corporation itself (through management) or by way of a 
derivative action.89 Despite the above judicial pronouncement, Professor Nicholls90 argues 
that there seems to be a diminished significance of the Rule under the Canadian modern 
statutory derivative action regime and should have become a historical relic if not for the 
occasional references to Foss v Harbottle by Canadian judges. Unlike Nigerian corporate 
law, the rule in Foss v Harbottle is not codified under Canadian company law and as such, 
it can be said that it is the corporate legislation, and not the “antique common law rule in 
Foss v Harbottle that determines when an action can or cannot be brought in the corporate 
                                                          
87Interim Report of the Select Committee on Company Law, Ontario, 1967 [Lawrence report] at para. 7.3.5. 
88 (1997) 2 SCR 165 at 211-212. 
89Ibid at 211. 
90Nicholls, supra note 13 at 398. 
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name”.91It can be argued that the insertion of the words “subject to other provisions of 
CAMA” set out in CAMA renders the application of the Rule irrelevant. Also, the fact that 
the circumstances under which the Rule was decided no longer apply in modern corporate 
law practice questions the relevance of the Rule. 
 
Commenting on the potential difficulty and confusion that the coexistence of both the 
statutory derivative action provisions and the rule in Foss v Harbottle and its exceptions, 
could pose, Beck had this to say: 
On balance, however it seems clear that the section was intended to be a code 
for the expansion and control of the derivative suit ... It would only lead to 
confusion to allow both common law and statutory actions. A more orderly 
development of the law would result from one point of access to a derivative 
action and would allow for a body of experience and precedent to be built up to 
guide shareholders.92 
 
This is not to suggest that there are not very good reasons for the courts to prevent 
individual shareholders in the normal course from instituting legal action, for instance 
where the action is based on the alleged diminution in value of their shares.93 Such 
limitations are generally advantageous to corporations, the judiciary and the economy at 
large. For companies, it facilitates collective action,94 allows management to focus on the 
daily running of the company business95 and encourages corporate financing which is 
decisively important for corporations.96As regards the judiciary, it saves the courts’ time 
and the public budget.97 To the economy, the rule helps companies to prosper and the more 
companies prosper, the better it is for the economy overall.98This is because if this rule did 
not exist, shareholders and other stakeholders would probably institute actions in the name 
of the company at any slight opportunity, thereby diverting the funds of the company for 
                                                          
91Ibid. 
92 SM Beck, "The Shareholders' Derivative Action" (1974) 52 Can Bar Rev159 at 207.   
93Groupe d’action d’investisseurs dans Biosyntech c. Tsang [2016] QCCA 1923. 
94
Mark Hager, "Bodies Politic: The Progressive History of Organizational 'Real Entity' Theory", (1989) 50 
U.Pitt.L.Rev. 575 at p. 633. 
95
Stephen Griffin, Company law: Fundamental Principles 2nd ed., (London: Pitman, 1996) at pp 299-300. 
96
Bernard Black, "Is Corporate Law Trivial? A Political and Economic Analysis"(1990) 84:2 North-Western 
University Law Reviewat 552. 
97Mac Dougall v. Gardiner (1875), 1 Ch. D. p 13, per Melish L. J. 
98
LainMacNeil, "Company Law Rules: An Assessment from the Perspective of Incomplete Contract Theory" 
(2001) 1:1 J.C.L.S 107 at p 117. 
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legal costs. However, with this rule in place, the company is not made to incur legal costs 
as a result of potentially trivial or unmeritorious actions brought by stakeholders in the 
company. 
 
Despite the wavering relevance of the Rule, one factor that is certain is that the great 
difficulties of this Rule gave rise to the current minority shareholders protection we have 
under many corporate statutes today, most especially derivative actions. A derivative action 
is a remedy devised to address the harm done to the company, rather than the harm done 
to an individual shareholder. At a theoretical level, it may appear as though the difference 
between a derivative action and personal action is very clear. However, in practice, it can 
be difficult to distinguish one from the other especially when personal and derivative 
actions are interrelated99, such as in the case of the payment of excessive remuneration to 
directors.100 While payment of excessive remuneration is traditionally characterized as a 
wrong to the corporation, it could also be characterized as a wrong to shareholders as it 
may result in a depreciation of the value of their investments. The fact remains that it is 
almost inevitable that wrong to a corporation will adversely affect the value of 
shareholders’ investments in the corporation.101 The Ontario Court of Appeal in Goldex 
Mines Ltd v. Revill102 recognized the difficulty of this interrelationship and confirmed that 
the same wrongful act can be both a wrong to the company and to each shareholder. The 
Court further provided some guidance in the determination of whether the wrong gave rise 
to a personal or derivative action. The Court quoted with approval from the judgment of 
Traynor C.J. in the California case of Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co.103 wherein Traynor 
C.J. refers to Shaw v. Empire Savings & Loan Assoc:104 
  the court [in Shaw] noted the "well established general rule that a stockholder 
of a corporation has no personal or individual right of action against third 
persons, including the corporation's officers and directors, for a wrong or 
injury to the corporation which results in the destruction or depreciation of 
the value of his stock, since the wrong suffered by the stockholder is merely 
                                                          
99M. Patrick Baxter, “The Derivative Action under the Ontario Business Corporations Act: A review of 
Section 97” (1982) 27:3 McGill LJ 27 453 [Baxter] at 456. 
100Dan Prentice, Comment (1976) 15 U.W.O. L. Rev. 225 at 2312. 
101Ibid. 
102[1974]7 O.R. (2d) 216 (C.A.) 
103460 P.2d 464 (Cal. 1969) 
104 186 Cal. App. 2d 401 (Dist. Ct App. 1960). 
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incidental to the wrong suffered by the corporation and affects all 
stockholders alike." From this the court reasoned that a minority shareholder 
could not maintain an individual action unless he could demonstrate the injury 
was somehow different from that suffered by other minority shareholders. In 
so concluding the court erred. The individual wrong necessary to support a 
suit by a shareholder need not be unique to that plaintiff. The same injury may 
affect a substantial number of shareholders. If the injury is not incidental to 
an injury to the corporation, an individual cause of action exists.  
 
The Court of Appeal interpreted Traynor C.J. to mean that a personal action would not 
arise "simply because the corporation itself has been damaged and as a consequence of the 
damage to it, its shareholders have been injured".105In other words, such wrong done to the 
shareholder must exist on its own circumstance and not be incidental to a wrong done to 
the corporation for a personal action to exist. This test has been criticized on the ground 
that the Court provided no clarity on what constitutes incidental injury and no reason why 
an incidental injury should not be treated as a personal wrong if it actually affects the 
personal rights of the shareholder.106 Irrespective of the test employed by the Court, there 
will always be grey areas that are not easy to categorize.107Practically, all shareholder suits 
cannot be “arbitrarily placed in one category to the exclusion of others”.108 In view of the 
above, this thesis will focus on the adequacy of minority shareholders’ protections for both 
personal injury and injury done to the corporation, that is, both derivative action and 
oppression remedy. Thus, the remedies of “derivative actions” and “oppression remedies” 
under both Nigerian and Canadian law will be considered in detail in the following chapter 
in order to access how these provisions adequately protect minority shareholders, which 
may, in turn, encourage capital market investments.  
 
 
 
                                                          
105 Baxter, supra note 99 at 456. 
106Ibid. 
107Ibid. 
108Ibid. 
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Conclusion 
 
In view of the fact that the CBCA operates under a division of powers model, while the 
Nigerian corporate statute is based on a contractarian model, this chapter highlights the 
features of both models in order to determine whether the two jurisdictions are extremely 
different such that a comparison between them will be totally unrealistic. This chapter notes 
that many contractarian corporate statutes model like the CAMA have adopted most of the 
distinct features of the division of power model and as such, the remaining practical 
differences between the two are not significant, such that they may be meaningfully 
compared. 
 
This chapter also sets out a brief background of the corporate law concept of majority rule 
and assesses the relevance of the Rule in Foss v Harbottle under each jurisdiction. It reveals 
that the rigid application of the corporate legal personality and majority rule created a need 
for minority shareholders’ protection such as the derivative action which allows a 
shareholder to obtain a remedy on behalf of the corporation for harm done to the 
corporation. It further highlights the difficulty the courts face in distinguishing between a 
wrong done to the corporation and one done to the shareholders as sometimes an act could 
be both a wrong done to the corporation, as well as to the shareholder. 
The following chapter will examine more closely the derivative action, i.e., the minority 
shareholders’ protection that addresses wrongs done to the corporation under Canadian and 
Nigerian corporate law.  
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Chapter 2: Comparative Analysis of the Derivative Action under 
Nigerian and Canadian Corporate Law 
Introduction 
 
In line with the objectives of this thesis, this chapter highlights one of the key minority 
shareholders’ protections available under Nigerian and Canadian corporate law. 
Specifically, this chapter reviews the statutory provisions relating to the derivative action 
under both jurisdictions, in order to examine the extent to which the remedy adequately 
protects minority shareholders today under Nigerian law. This chapter reveals certain areas 
of convergence and other areas of uniqueness with respect to the derivative action under 
Nigerian and Canadian corporate law. It also reveals how certain prerequisites to 
commencing a derivative action provided in the statutes and the judicial interpretations of 
these prerequisites may hinder the full protection of minority shareholders in a corporation. 
This then buttresses the hypothesis that there is room for improvement of this provision 
under Nigerian corporate law, to enable minority shareholders to feel adequately protected 
and, in turn, more prepared to invest in Nigerian companies and so benefit the Nigerian 
economy.  
This chapter will focus on the derivative action because it is one of the two principal means 
under the corporate law statutes through which minority shareholders may seek to address 
harms. From the shareholders’ perspective, corporate wrongs can be done in two forms – 
to the corporation or directly to the shareholders of the corporation. The derivative action 
is usually instituted to remedy wrongs done to the corporation;109 while the oppression 
remedy is instituted to correct an oppressive or unfairly prejudicial act or an act that 
unfairly disregards the interests of shareholders and certain other stakeholders in the 
corporation.110 However, as highlighted in chapter 2, some wrongs done to the corporation 
may affect the rights or interests of the shareholders in the long run. Thus focusing on the 
derivative action means assessing one of the two significant prongs under corporate law, 
                                                          
109 Although, in a derivative suit, the court may direct that an amount be paid to the complainant in whole 
or in part, the remedy is nevertheless used to remedy wrongs done to the corporation.  
110 This remedy will be discussed in the following chapter. 
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through which minority shareholders’ rights may be protected whether directly or 
indirectly, as the case may be. 
Furthermore, emphasis will be placed on minority shareholders in a corporation because 
their relationship with directors, members of the management (especially senior 
management) and other majority shareholders may place them in a vulnerable position. In 
modern-day corporations, directors are said to be the most powerful organ in the 
corporation because of the wide range of powers they have.111Directors are usually 
empowered to manage or supervise the management of the corporation’s business and 
affairs (by delegating some of their functions to officers of the corporation), except in cases 
where the matter is specifically assigned to the shareholders in a general meeting. Because 
the directors have a wide range of powers, and shareholders are in a vulnerable position 
with respect to the directors, the statutes usually provide that directors exercise these 
powers in a fiduciary manner.112 However, there are instances where the directors or their 
delegates engage in forms of self-dealing and insider trading which may result in 
managerial consumption of privileges to the detriment of other stakeholders in the 
corporation.113 
The shareholders, on the other hand, are empowered to make certain decisions, for 
example, the decision to elect or remove directors. In most instances, corporate matters are 
decided by a voting system dependent on the number of shares a shareholder holds in the 
corporation, thereby enabling dominant shareholders to use their voting powers to the 
detriment of the corporation. For instance, dominant shareholders in a corporation may 
vote in favour of a certain transaction to be undertaken by the corporation even when it is 
not likely that the corporation may be successful in that venture, but simply because the 
dominant shareholder (s) may benefit from that business. 
                                                          
111Martin Getter, “Why do Shareholder Derivative Suits Remain Rare in Continental Europe” (2012) 37:3 
Brook.J.Int’l L 884 at 847. 
112Michael Jensen & William Meckling, "Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and 
Ownership Structure" (1976) SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 94043, Social Science Research Network. 
113See section 279(7)CAMA and 122 (1) CBCA. 
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With the provisions of a derivative action in place, minority shareholders are able to correct 
wrongs done to the corporation by the directors, dominant shareholder (s) or even outsiders 
which could subsequently affect their interests.   
2. Derivative Actions under the Nigerian Corporate Law 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the rule in Foss v Harbottle provides that only the 
corporation can bring a suit when a wrong has been done to it, and, where such wrong can 
be ratified by the majority of shareholders in a general meeting, the court will not interfere. 
Section 299 of the CAMA codifies this common-law rule by providing that subject to 
certain exceptions, “where an irregularity has been committed in the course of a company's 
affairs or any wrong has been done to the company, only the company can sue to remedy 
the wrong and only the company can ratify the irregular conduct”. A strict application of 
this general rule may restrict the access of minority shareholders to remedy a corporate 
wrong, despite the fact that the basis upon which the decision was reached in Foss v 
Harbottle does not apply in modern business corporations.114 
The implication of this is that shareholders who want to remedy a wrong done to the 
corporation can only do so if either the company itself (i.e., as determined by the directors) 
decides to institute an action or if they fall under the exceptions to the rule in Foss v 
Harbottle, now codified in the CAMA. A plethora of Nigerian cases have continued to 
reiterate this principle.115 In Tanimola & Ors v Surveys and Mapping Geodata,116 the 
minority shareholders holding 6% of the company shares brought an action against the 
directors on the ground that they had carried out some acts that were contrary to the 
corporate constitution of the company. The court held that the operation of a company is 
                                                          
114 As noted in Chapter 1, the rule in Foss v Harbottle was decided on the basis that the corporate documents 
provided that the power to institute legal proceedings was vested in the shareholders in a general meeting – 
which is not the case in modern day corporations.  
115NIB Investment (West Africa) v. Chief Omisore (2005) LPELR -7527 (CA); Elufioye & Ors v. Halilu & 
Ors (1993) LPELR -1120 (SC); PDP v. Abubakar (2007) 3 NWLR (Pt. 10220 515 at 552. 
1161995) 6 NWLR (Pt.403) 617. 
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principally by the will of the majority shareholders and “where there is litigation in respect 
of the affairs of the company, the principle as to the competence of such action is generally 
governed by what has become known as the rule in Foss v. Harbottle”.117Clearly, the 
directors had breached the corporate constitution, however, the courts refused to interfere 
with the affairs of the company on the basis of the rule in Foss v Harbottle as codified in 
Section 299 of CAMA.  
Although the common law rule as codified in Section 299 of the CAMA helps to curb a 
number of frivolous actions that may be instituted by shareholders or other stakeholders, 
and also ensures that the court is not interfering with the affairs of the corporation at the 
slightest chance,118 nevertheless it may also serve as a hindrance to the protection of 
shareholders’ rights. This is because a restriction to bring an action to remedy a wrong 
done to the corporation could as well be a restriction to bring an action to enforce the 
shareholders’ rights. For instance, where the directors of the company are mismanaging its 
profits and acting against their fiduciary duties, a shareholder who wants to bring an action 
to remedy this wrong may be prevented on the ground that such wrong is one done to the 
company and so should be brought by the company itself and not the shareholder. While 
on the surface of things it is true that the wrong is one done to the company, it should be 
noted that such mismanagement by the directors could result in shareholders not obtaining 
the expected returns on their investments, or in the worst case, no returns on their 
investments. This is the underlying concern of most shareholders. 
In response to these difficulties arising from the common-law rule, the Nigerian Law 
Reform Commission119recommended the introduction of the statutory derivative action to 
strike a balance between the risk of unreasonable interference in the affairs of the company 
on one hand and judicial recourse for the shareholders on the other hand.120 The derivative 
remedy available under Nigerian corporate law is embodied in Sections 303 – 309 of the 
CAMA. It is a statutory representative action instituted or defended by a shareholder on 
                                                          
117(1843) 67 ER 189. 
118Mac Dougall v. Gardiner [1875], 1 Ch. D. p 13, per Melish L. J. 
119 Nigerian Law Reform Commission Report on Reform of Nigerian Company Law, Vol. 1, 2 and 3. 
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A Reisberg, Derivative Actions and Corporate Governance: Theory and Operation (London: Oxford 
University Press, 2007) at 186. 
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behalf of a company, in order to remedy a wrong done to a company in circumstances 
where the directors are unwilling to institute an action on behalf of the corporation.121In the 
case of Agip (Nigeria) Limited v. Agip Petrol Int’l122, the Court defined a derivative action 
as follows: 
A derivative action also known as a shareholder derivative suit is a lawsuit 
brought by a shareholder on behalf of a company against a third party. 
Often the third party is an insider of the corporation such as the directors 
or executive officers. 
In most derivative suits instituted in Nigerian courts, the defendants are usually the 
directors or executive officers, who are normally statutorily empowered to decide whether 
or not to institute an action on behalf of the corporation. Because it is the directors who are 
empowered to manage the business of the company, and where it is directors themselves 
who are at fault, it is very unlikely that they will institute an action on behalf of the 
company to remedy their own wrong.123 In order to protect the interests of the company 
and its shareholders while avoiding unreasonable interference with the management of the 
company, the law allows stakeholders to initiate a derivative action against the directors or 
any other wrongdoers provided those shareholders have fulfilled all statutory requirements 
under the derivative remedy provision. Apart from protecting shareholders’ rights, 
derivative action provisions also have deterrent objectives, i.e. the existence of the remedy 
prevents managerial misconduct by imposing the threat of action by shareholders, which 
may lead to personal liability of the directors or other wrongdoers as the case may be.124 
Even though this remedy plays a fundamental role in protecting shareholders’ rights and 
interests, this remedy is not available in every circumstance. Just like many jurisdictions 
across the world, the CAMA clearly states the circumstances under which this remedy will 
                                                          
121Eluromma, supra note 57 at 68. 
122[2010] All FWLR (PT. 520) 1198 S.C at page 1230, Para D-G. 
123Kunle Aina, "Current Developments in the Law on Derivative Action in Nigerian Company Law", SSRN 
Scholarly Paper ID 2617480, Social Science Research Network, 2014) at 2 [Aina]. Practically, such a director 
will rather rectify the wrong or quietly cover such wrong (if it is one that can be covered) than institute an 
action to remedy the wrong and thereby expose their wrong doings. 
124KM Choo, “The Statutory Derivative Action in Singapore – A Critical Examination” (2001) 13:1 
BondLaw Rw 64 at 68. 
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be available and also sets out the procedural requirements that a shareholder will need to 
comply with before instituting a derivative action. These requirements are discussed below.  
2.1.2. Who may bring a Derivative Action? 
 
Section 309 of the CAMA lists the categories of persons that may bring an application for 
a derivative action. These are: 
a) a registered holder or a beneficial owner and a former registered holder or beneficial 
owner, of a security of a company;    
b) a director or an officer or a former director or officer of a company;  
c) the Corporate Affairs Commission; or   
d) any other person who in the discretion of the court, is a proper person to make an 
application under Section 303, i.e., the derivative action provision in CAMA. 
Emphasis will be laid on subsection (a) because the focus of this thesis is on the legal 
protection available to minority shareholders and this sub-section empowers a registered 
holder or beneficial owner or former registered or beneficial owner of a security of a 
company to bring an application for a derivative action. A registered holder of a security 
of a company is a holder of record that has shares directly with the company. Beneficial 
ownership includes ownership of shares through any trustee, legal representative, agent or 
other intermediaries. 
Clearly, section 309 of the CAMA specifies the categories of persons authorized to bring 
an application for a derivative action and also empowers the Nigerian court to use its 
discretion in permitting a person to bring an application for a derivative action. With 
respect to the latter, it appears that the intention of the legislature is to allow a broader 
number of persons not expressly mentioned under the section to be able to bring an action, 
subject to the discretion of the courts. However, it appears as though the courts are not very 
willing to use this discretion. In the case of Chief Akintola Williams & ors v Edu125 the 
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Court of Appeal in Nigeria was of the view that a non-member of a company cannot 
institute a derivative action under the section. The court noted as follows: 
section 303 (1) of the CAMA allows a shareholder to commence derivative 
action under certain circumstances set out therein. I am of the view that 
none of those circumstances can arise. The plaintiff herein is not shown 
to be the shareholder of the 7th defendant company. It is for the foregoing 
reason that claims 2, 3, and 4 of the respondent ought to be struck out for 
want of locus standi.126 
While the court correctly confirmed that the plaintiff was not a shareholder, the court did 
not acknowledge that it had the discretionary power to allow a plaintiff to institute this 
action if it thought the plaintiff was a proper person. Instead, the court refused to allow the 
plaintiff on the basis that he was not a shareholder and did not have locus standi in the 
reliefs sought. The test adopted by the court to determine whether the plaintiff was a proper 
party is the “locus standi” test. One may assume that the court will apply this locus standi 
principle in exercising its discretion in allowing a proper person to sue. Surprisingly, the 
courts have continued to apply this principle in generally deciding whether or not to accept 
a derivative application, even where the plaintiff is a member of the association or company 
as the case may be and has been clearly given the “standing” to bring an application for a 
derivative action by virtue of the provisions of the CAMA. In other words, the Nigerian 
courts have denied members of a council (the decision-making body) of a body corporate 
(equivalent to the directors in a corporation) from bringing a derivative action on the basis 
of lack of locus standi even though the derivative action provision allows directors of the 
corporation to bring an application for leave to commence such an action.  
In the case Adenuga v Odumeru,127the Supreme Court reiterated this position where it held 
that even though the plaintiffs were financial members of the body corporate and were 
instituting an action against the defendants on behalf of the council,128 i.e., the decision 
                                                          
126Ibid at 414. 
127 (2002) FNWDR (pt 821) 163. Although this was not a company but an association, section 299 of the 
CAMA and the derivative action provision apply.  
128 The council was the decision-making body of the association and exercised power to institute actions on 
behalf of the association just like directors of a corporation.  
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making body of the association, they did not have the locus standi129 to institute such an 
action. The court emphasized the sufficient interest rule: 
The mere fact that appellants are financial members of the eighth defendant 
has not conferred on them Locus Standi because that alone would not 
disclose sufficient interest for them to bring this action. Looking at the 
statement of claim, the appellants have not disclosed sufficient interest to 
justify their bringing this action. A party must in his statement of claim aver 
enough facts to indicate what his interests are in the matter and how those 
interests stand threatened if the action was not brought. It is not enough to 
blandly state that he has an interest; there must be an averment that the 
interest is threatened.130 
In other words, apart from ensuring that an individual (s) falls within the categories of 
persons listed under the CAMA or is permitted by virtue of the exercise of discretion of the 
courts, the courts usually examine whether the plaintiff has sufficient interest and such 
interest must be real, expressly set out on its statement of claim and not merely 
imaginary.131 The question that then arises is - whether the express authorization of certain 
stakeholders under the statute to bring an application for leave to commence a derivative 
action is not enough to confer on them locus standi? Why do the plaintiff’s personal 
sufficient interests matter?  This extraneous condition adopted by the courts is quite 
restrictive as the Act expressly sets out the categories of persons that may apply for leave 
to institute a derivative action and makes no mention of other factors. This is not to say that 
the courts should permit every person to bring a derivative action but such judgment should 
be decided solely by adhering to the provisions of the statute (which sets out the persons 
who can bring an application for leave to commence a derivative action) and not by 
introducing some extraneous test – “sufficient interests”- so as not to frustrate the intentions 
of the legislature which is clearly to accommodate the persons specified in the section to 
seek redress on behalf of the company.132 
 
 
                                                          
129Locus standi is the right or ability to bring a legal action to a court of law, or to appear in a court. 
130 [2002] 8 NWLR (pt. 821) 163.   
131Adenuga v Odumeru [2002] 3 NWLR (Pt 754) 400. 
132Aina, supra note 123 at 13. 
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2.1.3. Application to Court for Leave to Initiate a Derivative Action under CAMA 
 
Further to Section 303 (1) of the CAMA, an applicant may apply to the court for leave to 
bring an action in the name or on behalf of a company, or to intervene in an action to which 
the company is a party, for the purpose of prosecuting, defending or discontinuing the 
action on behalf of the company. The rationale for making an applicant apply for leave is 
to help reduce the amount of trivial or malicious actions brought before the courts, and the 
costs the company will bear in defending the numerous suits especially if the financial 
effect on the company may outweigh its benefits even if the claim has merit.133More so, 
“uncontrolled access to the remedy could also result in potential directors feeling so 
vulnerable to suit that they decline such positions and companies and their directors facing 
underserved reputational and financial damage due to a proliferation of spurious 
actions”.134 
While the CAMA provides the requirement of the application for leave to commence a 
derivative action, it does not set out the procedure required to be adopted in applying for 
the leave from the courts. In Agip (Nigeria) Ltd v Agip Petroleum International & 
Ors,135the minority shareholders commenced an action by filing a Writ of Summons and 
also filed an ex parte application for leave to commence the derivative action in the name 
of the company. With respect to the mode of commencing the action, the court held that 
“by the community reading of sections 303 of the Companies and Allied Matters Act and 
Rules 2 (1) and (2) of the Companies Proceedings Rules, an application for leave to 
prosecute a derivative action is to be commenced by an originating summons and not 
otherwise.”136 The court went further to note that where any proceedings are begun other 
than as provided in the Rules, such proceedings are incompetent. And once there is a defect 
in competence, it is fatal and the proceedings are a nullity.137 In other words, the court 
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134Ibid at para 102. 
135[2010] LPELR 250 (SC). 
136Ibid. 
137 See also Ajao v Alao [1986] 5 NWLR Pt. 45 at Pg. 802; Asore v Lemanu [1994)] 7 NWLR Pt. 356 Pg. 
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refused to overlook the wrongful commencement mode -Writ of Summons - and treat it as 
a mere irregularity.138 
The decision of the courts is not surprising as Rules 2 (1) and (2) of the Companies 
Proceedings Rules provide that “every application under the Act shall be made by 
originating summons” and perhaps the use of the word “shall” in Rule 2, which connotes 
a mandatory requirement, was the basis upon which the court insisted on that mode and 
refused to treat it as a mere irregularity. The issue is that adherence to technicality does 
more harm than good to our corporate legal system. A Writ of Summons clearly states the 
parties, issues, and reliefs of the applicant, in the same way as an Originating Summons; 
so long as both documents show proof of the conditions to be satisfied as provided under 
CAMA, why then should a mere technicality be the basis upon which the courts refuse to 
grant such leave? More so, the trial court in the above-reported case had noted that the 
basis upon which he had granted the leave in the first place was because he had examined 
the documents which led him to the conclusion that the applicants had a prima facie case. 
This is not to say that the provisions of the Rules should be disregarded. However, in the 
absence of legislative amendment, the court should adopt a more flexible approach such 
that where the non-compliance is one that relates to the form and not substance of the 
application, then the court should apply the principles of equity and not outrightly declare 
it a nullity.  
The strict adherence to technicalities as displayed in the Agip case may have amounted to 
injustice to the minority shareholders who were not able to obtain a remedy partly because 
they commenced the action with the wrong mode. Even though the application will still 
have been dismissed on the ground that the defendants did not receive notice of the motion 
filed by the plaintiff which is against the cardinal principle of fair hearing, the express 
declaration by the court that the action was a nullity on the ground that the applicants 
commenced the action with the wrong mode implies that the court would have made the 
same decision even if the fair hearing principle was not violated. 
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In practice, once this leave is granted to a minority shareholder, such shareholder is then 
empowered to institute an action on behalf of the company regardless of the rule in Foss v 
Harbottle. The court must, however, be satisfied that the following conditions stipulated in 
CAMA139 are present before a leave for a derivative action can be granted: 
a) the wrongdoers are the directors who are in control, and will not take necessary 
action;   
b) the applicant has given reasonable notice to the directors of the company of his 
intention to apply to the court for leave for a derivative action, if the directors of 
the company do not bring, diligently prosecute or defend or discontinue the action;   
c) the applicant is acting in good faith; and    
d) it appears to be in the best interest of the company that the action be brought,   
prosecuted, defended or discontinued.140   
Further emphasis will be laid on two conditions provided in subsection (b) and (c) that 
appear to have vague interpretations.  
2.1.3.1 Reasonable Notice to the Directors 
 
Section 303 (2) (b) of CAMA requires the applicant to give reasonable notice to the 
directors of the corporation of his intention to apply for leave for a derivative action. This 
is very important because Section 303 ordinarily strips the directors of their statutory power 
to authorize bringing an action in the name of the company, and therefore, it is only fair 
that the directors are given notice of the proposed action to be instituted by the 
shareholder.141It is also possible that the directors may not have directed their minds to this 
course of action and such notice will then give them the first opportunity to exercise their 
statutory powers by instituting the action to redress the wrong.142 If the directors fail to 
authorize the action after a reasonable amount of time, then the applicant may proceed to 
file the application.  
The challenge with this provision is that it does not stipulate the specific number of days, 
weeks or months that will be deemed to be “reasonable notice” to the directors, in order 
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141Aina, supra note 123 at 13. 
142Ibid. 
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for the court to grant leave for a derivative action.143Thus, this provision may then be used 
as a tool by the directors to delay such derivative action on the ground that the company is 
not ready to take action and will require more time since there is no specific time stipulated 
in CAMA.144 It also does not provide any exceptions to the pre-action notice; neither does 
it give the court liberty to decide whether to do away with this provision, especially in the 
event that it would not be expedient to do so. The specific content of the notice is also not 
set out; perhaps, such notice should contain sufficient details to enable directors to know 
the specific actions to remedy. Where the directors take action by filing the action on behalf 
of the company, a derivative action will not be necessary. However, this is usually not the 
case because where the directors are the wrongdoers in control (which is a condition 
precedent for bringing the action) it is not likely that they will bring an action against 
themselves.145 Dr. Aina is of the view that the requirement of notice to directors is 
superfluous and unnecessary and may serve as an opportunity for directors to organize their 
affairs or cover up their misdeeds.146 It is however arguable that removing this provision 
may go against the principle of fairness, bearing in mind that the CAMA ordinarily 
empowers directors to authorize bringing an action on behalf of the company, and 
proceeding to do so without informing the directors may violate their statutory powers.  
2.1.3.2 Good Faith  
 
Section 303 (2) (c) of the CAMA provides that the applicant must show that the application 
was filed in good faith. The essence of this provision is to ensure that derivative actions 
are not brought out of personal vendettas against the directors of the corporation or do not 
turn to vexatious actions.147 Since CAMA does not provide a definition or guidance 
regarding what constitutes good faith or bad faith, the Nigerian courts have looked at the 
English cases to determine what the phrase “good faith” means. In Shodeinde & Ors v Reg. 
Trustees of Ahmadiyya,148 the court defined “good faith” as the absence of bad faith. The 
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court further noted that “a thing is done in good faith or bona fide where it is in fact done 
honestly whether it is done negligently or not.”149 The issue that arises with this definition 
is how to determine “honesty”. In practice, what the applicant does is to simply declare on 
the face of the application that the application is meritorious and supportable.150 
The disadvantage of this provision is that it may be somewhat difficult to prove because 
where the directors, who normally have the responsibility of deciding what is in the 
corporation’s best interests, have decided not to take action, it could be argued that any 
action taken by any shareholder was brought in bad faith.151 This provision also gives the 
court wide discretion to shut out applications that may have been meritorious on the ground 
that in the opinion of the court, it was not brought in good faith despite that the phrase is 
not defined in CAMA.152 
It is worthy to note that the above listed 4 conditions must all be satisfied before the court 
can grant leave for instituting a derivative action. Therefore, the absence of any of the 
above conditions will result in the court refusing to grant the leave to institute a derivative 
action.   
2.1.4. Powers of the Court 
 
Further to Section 304 of the CAMA, a court hearing a derivative suit may at any time make 
any order or orders as it deems fit. The court is also specifically authorized to make one or 
more of the following orders: 
a) authorizing the applicant or any other person to control the conduct of the 
action;  
b) giving directions for the conduct of the action;   
c) directing that any amount adjudged payable by a defendant in the action shall 
be paid, in whole or in part, directly to former and present security holders 
of the company instead of to the company;    
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d) requiring the company to pay reasonable legal fees incurred by the applicant 
in connection with the proceedings.153   
Unlike the rule in Foss v Harbottle, where the court pronounced the importance of judicial 
non-interference with any act that can be ratified by the majority, CAMA provides that the 
court has no power to stay or dismiss an application merely because it is shown that an 
alleged breach of right or duty owed to the company has been or may be approved by the 
shareholders of such company.154 However, the evidence of approval by the shareholders 
may be taken into account by the court in making an order under Section 304 of the CAMA. 
In other words, the issue of ratification is not a factor the court considers in granting leave, 
however, the directors can show that the act has been ratified by the company and it is not 
willing to take further action on the matter and such evidence may be considered by the 
court in making orders.  
Section 306 of CAMA also provides for instances where the parties agree to withdraw or 
settle the matter out of court. The court must approve such discontinuance, settlement or 
dismissal, and if the court is of the view that the rights of any applicant may be substantially 
affected by such stay, discontinuance, settlement or dismissal, the court may order any 
party to the application or action to give notice to the applicant. This provision is very 
essential to the interests of a minority shareholder who may be an applicant, because it 
prevents collusive settlements between the other parties for their benefit, at the expense of 
the company or minority shareholder.155If the court believes that the discontinuance or 
withdrawal will be detrimental to the rights of the applicant or company, the court may 
refuse to approve such withdrawal or discontinuance and appoint an independent person or 
inform the Corporate Affairs Commission to continue the matter.156 
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2.1.5. The Shortcomings of the Nigerian Derivative Action 
 
No doubt, the derivative action provisions available under Nigerian law to a large extent 
mitigate the hardship arising from the common law rule; however, the provisions are not 
without shortcomings. The vagueness in the derivative action provision and the strict 
interpretation adopted by the courts may have a significant impact on the protection of 
minority shareholders’ rights. For instance, the pre-action notice required to be provided 
by the applicant does not stipulate the number of days, weeks or months required. Also, 
the rigid interpretation and rules of the courts in including the “locus standi” test and 
insisting upon a particular procedural mode of commencement of the action can frustrate 
the use of the derivative action as a remedial tool for minority shareholders’ protection. 
Also, the lengthy proceeding arising from the tactical delays orchestrated by the directors 
or their counsel as a result of the vague statutory provisions could be burdensome for 
minority shareholders who do not want to incur legal costs chasing a matter for which they 
are not certain to a reasonably probable degree that they will obtain a remedy. The situation 
is even worse where the legal costs to be incurred over a long span of time are enormous 
and unreasonable compared to the minority shareholders’ returns on investments unless the 
court gives an order for the company to pay the interim costs of the applicant.157In the 
absence of such an order for interim costs, the best business decision for the aggrieved 
minority shareholders will then be to discontinue the matter, or not institute the action in 
the first place having calculated the estimated time span of the action, legal costs and the 
chances of not obtaining a remedy.  
The following section will examine the derivative remedy under Canadian corporate law 
to determine whether its provisions have similar shortcomings or if it adequately protects 
the interests of minority shareholders. 
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2.2. Derivative Action under Canadian Corporate Law 
 
2.2.1. Introduction 
 
Under Canadian law, a derivative action is a remedy provided to a “complainant” that 
enables him to bring an action in the name or on behalf of the corporation or any of its 
subsidiaries in order to assert or defend the rights of the corporation or subsidiary.158 It has 
been described as the “minority shareholder’s sword to the majority’s twin shields of 
corporate personality and majority rule”.159In other words, this remedy allows 
complainants the opportunity to challenge any misuse of managerial power on behalf of 
directors or managers of the corporation, irrespective of the rule in Foss v Harbottle and 
the corporate legal personality principle. Without this remedy, a minority shareholder will 
only be able to rectify a wrong done to the corporation or to his rights or overcome the 
difficulties that may arise from corporate personality and majority rule by persuading the 
majority shareholders to agree with his point of view or to use their “majority rule” power 
to replace the incumbent board of directors who have the power to cause the corporation 
to sue.160 
Just as under Nigerian law, the majority rule in Foss v Harbottle worked great hardship on 
minority shareholders most especially because of the limited exceptions that were available 
under the common law. Due to the hardship arising from the strict application of this rule, 
it became imperative for Canadian legislators to create statutory remedies that could 
adequately protect minority shareholders in a corporation.161As highlighted in Chapter 1, 
the Ontario government set up a committee in 1967 to make proposals for corporate law 
reform, including provisions relating to minority shareholders’ protection. The product of 
this committee was the Lawrence Report which made recommendations for the derivative 
action remedy and other statutory remedies.162 The model reform that was recommended 
by the Lawrence Report for Ontario was later adopted at the federal level in the Dickerson 
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Report for the CBCA. This resulted in the enactment of sections 239163 and 240164 of the 
CBCA.  
It is important to note that the Canadian derivative action is very similar to the derivative 
action provisions available under Nigerian corporate law. Just like the Nigerian legislators 
who adopted section 210 of the U.K Companies Act of 1948, while also considering the 
recommendations made by the Jenkins Committee of 1959,165the Dickerson 
Committee166recommended the adoption of the OBCA provisions which were also 
influenced primarily by the recommendations made by the Jenkins Committee. However, 
as will be highlighted below, certain aspects of the Canadian derivative action provisions 
have been amended to provide more clarity and address the current realities of corporate 
law practice. 
2.2.2. Proper Party to Initiate Derivative Action 
 
The CBCA permits the same group of persons to bring an application for a derivative action 
as under the Nigerian derivative action provision. However, the CBCA expands this list to 
include a registered or beneficial owner or former registered or beneficial owner of any of 
the affiliates of the corporation.167Just as under the Nigerian derivative action provision 
which permits the CAC to bring a derivative action, the CBCA permits the CBCA Director 
to bring a derivative action.168The CBCA also has a blanket phrase that allows the courts to 
permit any other person who in the discretion of the court is a proper person to make the 
application. In deciding whether a person is a proper person, the Canadian courts have 
noted that the purpose of the derivative action should be borne in mind, which is for 
minority shareholders’ protection and ensuring accountability. For instance, in the case of 
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a creditor169 who claims to be a proper person, the question is whether he would be a person 
who would reasonably be entrusted with the responsibility of advancing the interests of the 
corporation by seeking the remedy to right the wrong allegedly done to the corporation.170 
If the answer is in the affirmative, then the creditor might be pronounced to be a proper 
person by the courts.  
As highlighted above, the derivative action provision under the CBCA permits a registered 
or beneficial or former registered or beneficial owner of a security to initiate a derivative 
action not only in respect of the corporation itself but also in respect of a wrong done to 
an affiliate of the corporation. Companies that are in any of the following types of 
relationship are regarded as affiliates: holding company and subsidiary company; two or 
more subsidiaries of a common holding company; two or more companies controlled by 
the same person.171 This is a great tool in protecting minority shareholders in the sense 
that the directors of an affiliate cannot hide under the corporate personality rule asserting 
that the minority shareholder has no basis to sue since he is not a shareholder in the affiliate 
of the corporation. The effect of this is that, if for instance a director of a thriving 
subsidiary mismanaged profits or breached their fiduciary duties as a director, 
shareholders of a parent company will be allowed to bring a derivative action on behalf 
of the affiliate.172 
2.2.3. Application to Court for Leave to Initiate a Derivative Action under CBCA 
 
Section 239 (1) of the CBCA provides as follows:  
A complainant may apply to a court for leave to bring an action in the name 
and on behalf of a corporation or any of its subsidiaries, or intervene in an 
action to which any such body corporate is a party, for the purpose of 
prosecuting, defending or discontinuing the action on behalf of the body 
corporate. [Emphasis added]. 
                                                          
169 A creditor is not listed in Section 238 of the CBCA as a person empowered to institute a derivative action 
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170See First Edmonton Place Ltd v 315888 Alberta Ltd (1988) 40 BLR 28 at 63 (Alta QB). 
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The application for leave is fundamental to commencing a derivative suit on behalf of the 
corporation. Unlike the Nigerian corporate law, the CBCA gives an unrestrictive context 
on the mode of application for leave for a derivative action. Section 248 of the CBCA 
provides that an application by a complainant may be made in a summary manner by 
petition, originating notice of motion or otherwise as the rules of the court provide or 
subject to any order the court thinks fit. In the case of Muljadi v. O’brien,173the court 
examined section 247 of the OBCA to determine whether the language makes it mandatory 
for a party seeking an oppression remedy to go only by way of an application. Section 247 
of the OBCA provides that “a complainant…..may apply to the court for an order under 
the section”. The court held that since the section used the word “may” and not “shall”, 
then it appears the moving party has the power to decide upon the best approach. 
Furthermore, the court noted that when the legislature intended to take away discretion 
from counsel, it must say so in plain language and that was not the situation in section 247 
of the OBCA. Although the above-cited case was made in relation to the oppression remedy 
provision under the OBCA, the case is still significant here in relation to the interpretation 
provided by the court of the word “may” which is also used in section 248 of the CBCA. 
Applying the same logic to section 248 of the CBCA, the section provides that the 
application “may” be made in a summary manner but also leaves in the discretion of the 
party seeking the remedy the decision to go by way of an action.174 This leaves the 
complainant with options on the manner in which he can apply for leave for a derivative 
action and helps to simplify the procedure – a feature not present under Nigerian corporate 
law.  
Conflict may arise between the provisions of section 248 CBCA and the rules of the court 
where the mode set out in the rules is different from that provided under section 248.175 
However, in the event that a party chose the wrong form of originating process, the Ontario 
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Court of Appeal noted in Chilian v Augdome Corp,176 in compliance with civil procedure 
rules,177 that the court will not set aside the originating process on this ground. The court 
further noted that the current Canadian law does not reflect the attitude underlying the old 
common law rule where a litigant was non-suited for adopting the wrong form of 
action.178This position was reiterated in the case of Nuvex Ingredients Inc v. Snack Crafters 
Inc.179 Clearly, the Canadian courts adopt a flexible approach in deciding the appropriate 
mode of originating process used in applying for leave to commence a derivative action 
because of the legislative provisions and understand that dismissing an action based on the 
wrong mode of commencement would imply that the Canadian law is still subject to the 
unnecessary technicalities underlying the common law regime.  
Apart from the procedural issues, there are also substantive requirements the court looks 
out for when granting leave to commence a derivative action. The court will not grant the 
application for leave to commence a derivative action unless the following conditions are 
satisfied: 
a) the complainant has given notice to the directors of the corporation or its 
subsidiary of the complainant’s intention to apply to the court to initiate 
or defend a derivative action not less than fourteen (14) days before 
bringing the application, or as otherwise ordered by the court, if the 
directors of the corporation or its subsidiary do not bring, diligently 
prosecute or defend or discontinue the action;  
b) the complainant is acting in good faith; and  
c) it appears to be in the interests of the corporation or its subsidiary that the 
action be brought, prosecuted, defended or discontinued.180 
The above requirements are conjunctive and not mutually exclusive, and so if all of the 
requirements are not present, the court will not allow a derivative action to be brought or 
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defended. With respect to the first requirement, all that is required is a notification to the 
directors, which can be accomplished by sending a written request to the board of the 
corporation or by serving them with the notice of the application.181 Both methods would 
clearly show the lapse of time since the notice was given, as the statutory provision requires 
not less than 14 days' notice. Failure to provide evidence of this statutory notice will usually 
be fatal to an application for leave to commence a derivative action.182 However, in some 
cases, the shareholder may be unable to give the stipulated notice, such as, where the matter 
is one that requires the urgent attention of the court or where providing such notice will 
amount to unnecessary delay. In such instances, the court retains the power to dispense 
with the notice requirement.183 
The second requirement seeks to ensure that the complainant, i.e. typically a minority 
shareholder, in this case, is acting in good faith. Unfortunately, the CBCA does not give 
further context or guidelines to determine what “good faith” means. In Winfield v Daniel,184 
the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench noted that “good faith” exists where “there is a prima 
facie reason to believe that the applicant is acting with proper motives, i.e., a reasonable 
belief in the merits of the claim”.185 Usually, the court expects the applicant to establish 
clearly on a preponderance of evidence that the application is brought in good faith.186 In 
First Edmonton Place v 315888 Alberta Ltd,187 the court held that good faith is shown if 
the action is not motivated by a personal vendetta, and is not frivolous or vexatious. 
Furthermore, in Primex Investments Ltd. v Northwest Sports Enterprises Ltd. et al,188 the 
court held that mere self-interest does not constitute bad faith if the interests of the applicant 
and the corporation simply coincide; there must be other circumstances suggesting that the 
application is not brought in good faith.  
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Just like the other prerequisites, where the complainant is unable to prove good faith, the 
court will usually not grant leave to institute a derivative action. In McAskill v 
TransAtlantic Petroleum Corp189 the minority shareholder opposed the corporate merger 
of the corporation with another oil and gas corporation. He brought a derivative application 
on behalf of the corporation alleging that the union of the corporations was improvident 
and that some of the directors of the corporation were negligent, and had acted in breach 
of their duties. He had earlier proposed an arrangement which involved a large retainer and 
use of an airplane for a business owned by him. The court refused to grant leave on the 
basis that the applicant was not acting in good faith but was motivated by a personal 
vendetta stating that his inability to give any reason for not bringing action against all 
directors and his proposed arrangement were all indicative of bad faith. 
From the above, it is clear that even the courts have no definitive guidelines to determine 
what the phrase “good faith” means. In practice, the court examines the circumstances of 
each case in order to determine whether such an application was brought in “good faith” 
or not.190Professor Welling is of the opinion that this provision is meaningless especially 
because there are no clear cut rules to determine good faith and the provision, therefore, 
gives the judiciary the freedom to interpret the requirements as it likes or dismiss the 
application on the basis that in the opinion of the court, the applicant did not prove his good 
faith.191 However, eliminating this provision may open the directors to all sorts of litigation 
as stakeholders may bring an application for leave to commence a derivative action based 
on personal vendettas. Perhaps, providing guidelines as to determining what “good faith” 
connotes will help limit the courts’ discretionary power and create certainty for 
complainants prior to instituting the action to determine whether their matter will be 
considered as being brought in good faith or not. 
Finally, the court must be satisfied that the proposed derivative action is brought in the 
interests of the corporation or its subsidiary. The court need not be convinced that the 
proposed action is in fact in the best interest of the corporation but the court must be 
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satisfied that it appears to be in the corporation’s interest that the derivative action is 
initiated.192 In other words, the question that is to be raised by the court is whether the 
action has some prima facie merit, rather than whether the application will be successful.193 
2.2.4. Powers of the Court hearing a Derivative Action 
 
Upon granting leave to institute or defend a derivative action, the court will hear the 
application of the complainant and the defendants, who are usually the directors or 
shareholders who oppose the application for leave. The court may at any time during 
the action make any order it thinks fit including, without limiting the generality of 
the foregoing, the following:194 
a) an order authorizing the complainant or any other person to control the conduct 
of the action; 
b) an order giving directions for the conduct of the action; 
c) an order directing that any amount adjudged payable by a defendant in the 
action shall be paid, in whole or in part, directly to former and present security 
holders of the corporation or its subsidiary instead of to the corporation or its 
subsidiary; and 
d) an order requiring the corporation or its subsidiary to pay reasonable legal fees 
incurred by the complainant in connection with the action. 
Just as provided under the Nigerian legislation, the court may at any time order that the 
corporation or its subsidiary pays the legal fees incurred by a minority shareholder in a 
derivative suit. An order for interim costs allows the company to fund the expenses of 
litigation that a complainant may not be able to afford. Thus, a shareholder who is not 
financially buoyant can also pray the court to make an order directing the company to bear 
his legal costs. Furthermore, the mere fact that an alleged breach of a right or duty of a 
corporation has been ratified by the majority of shareholders in the corporation does not 
mean that the court will automatically dismiss or stay the application for a derivative action 
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– which is contrary to the rule laid down in Foss v Harbottle. However, the court may take 
into consideration the evidence of the approval of the shareholders in making an order.195 
2.3. Comparison of Minority Shareholder Remedy of Derivative Action under 
Nigerian and Canadian Corporate Law 
 
This section will conduct a comparative analysis of the derivative action available as a 
minority shareholder protection under Nigerian and Canadian corporate law. Although the 
statutory provisions and judicial decisions from both jurisdictions are to a large extent 
similar, there are certain significant areas of differences between both legal systems. This 
section will also assess the impact these differences have on the protection of minority 
shareholders under Nigerian and Canadian corporate law respectively. Some of the 
significant differences in the minority shareholder remedy of derivative actions are set out 
below: 
2.3.1 The Mode of Commencement 
 
The Nigerian Companies Proceedings Rules provides that all applications which include 
the derivative application should be made by originating summons.196 The Nigerian courts 
have dismissed any derivative application not brought in this form. The Canadian corporate 
law, on the other hand, provides that a derivative action may be made in a summary manner 
but also leaves in the discretion of the party seeking the remedy to proceed by way of 
action.197 Most importantly, the courts have pronounced, in line with civil procedure rules, 
that they will not set aside the originating process on the ground of wrong mode of 
commencement.198 The implication of this is that even where the counsel uses a wrong 
mode of originating process for a derivative action leave application, the court will not 
dismiss the application on that basis, and so, minority shareholders or their counsel, as the 
case may be, do not have to worry about the technicalities involved with filing an 
application for a derivative action. The legal technicality apparent in the Nigerian corporate 
                                                          
195 Section 242 (1) CBCA. 
196 Rule 2 (1) & (2) of the Companies Proceedings Rules 1992. 
197 Section 248 of the CBCA. 
198Chilian v Augdome Corp (1991) 2 OR 3d 696 (Ont CA). 
47 
 
 
legal system with respect to derivative actions may bar applicants from accessing justice 
as it increases costs of litigation in terms of time and financial expenses. This is because 
where an application or a judgment given pursuant to a wrong mode of commencement is 
nullified,199 the applicant may be frustrated and decline to apply again having incurred legal 
cost without obtaining a remedy. 
2.3.2. Proper Parties to Initiate a Derivative Action 
 
Nigerian and Canadian corporate law empowers holders of securities of a corporation to 
initiate or defend an action on behalf of the corporation provided certain requirements are 
satisfied. While Canadian law recognizes the right of a shareholder to bring derivative 
actions both in respect of a corporation and any of its affiliates,200 Nigerian corporate law 
does not extend such right to the affiliates of the corporation. What occurs under Nigerian 
corporate law is that a shareholder is only empowered to bring an action on behalf of the 
corporation in which it has its shareholding, and so, an application for leave to institute a 
derivative action brought by a shareholder on behalf of an affiliate may be refused on the 
ground that he lacks the locus standi to do so.201 This may negatively impact minority 
shareholders’ protection. For instance, where the directors of a subsidiary mismanage 
profits that subsequently affect the profits of the corporation in which the shareholder is a 
member, the shareholder of the parent company may not be allowed to bring a derivative 
action against the directors, subject to the discretion of the court. Given the Nigerian 
judiciary’s strict adherence to precedent, it is very unlikely that the courts will be willing 
to grant such a shareholder a leave to institute a derivative action on behalf of a subsidiary 
of a corporation in which the applicant is a registered holder of a security.202In accordance 
with the provisions of the CBCA, the Canadian courts on the other hand, will allow a 
shareholder of a parent company to bring a derivative action on behalf of the corporation 
or any of its affiliates. 
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In view of the above prejudice that could arise from this provision, and the need to provide 
a more suitable legal framework for investors, the 8th Session of the Nigerian National 
Assembly created the National Assembly Business Environment Roundtable (NASSBER) 
to ensure that the legal and regulatory framework promotes enterprise, growth and the right 
environment for investments. The product of the NASSBER was the enactment of the 
Companies and Allied Matters (Repeal and Re-enactment) Bill which has recently been 
passed by the Nigerian House of Representatives.203 The Bill extends the powers of 
shareholders to bring an action on behalf of a subsidiary of the company. It is the hope that 
this Bill is passed into law so as to enable shareholders of a corporation to bring an action 
on behalf of a subsidiary of a corporation in which it is a registered holder of security.204 
2.3.3. Notice to Directors before Commencing Derivative Action 
 
The CBCA requires a complainant to show that he has given a notice of not less than 14 
days to the directors of the corporation informing them of his intention of instituting a 
derivative action or as otherwise ordered by the court. The CAMA only requires that the 
complainant shows that “reasonable notice” of his intention to apply to the court has been 
given to the directors of the company. The challenge with this provision is that the phrase 
“reasonable notice” is not defined in the CAMA and so the directors can argue that the 
notice provided was not reasonable. The ultimate decision is then left in the hands of the 
judge to decide whether such notice is reasonable or not. Thus, reasonable notice maybe 3 
or 4 days or weeks or months depending on the circumstances and facts of each given case. 
The flexibility of this provision is advantageous in emergency circumstances where a 
notice period of 2-5 days may be deemed appropriate by the courts. The CBCA also 
authorizes the court to make orders that the length of time be abridged or that the notice be 
discarded.205 In the absence of such orders, the complainant will have to provide notice to 
the directors in order to be able to bring a derivative action. It is important to note that prior 
to 2001, the CBCA derivative action provision also required that “reasonable notice” be 
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given to the directors. However, this provision was amended in 2001 to include a specific 
notice, i.e., 14 days’ notice. 
2.3.4. Conditions Precedent to Bringing Derivative Actions 
The CBCA sets out three prerequisites that the complainant must satisfy before an 
application for leave to commence a derivative action will be granted by the court. These 
include showing that the complainant has given at least 14 days’ notice to the directors of 
the corporation or its affiliates of his intention to bring an action; that he is acting in good 
faith; and that he is also acting in the best interest of the corporation or its affiliates as the 
case may be. Nigerian corporate law provides that the applicant must satisfy four 
prerequisites. In addition to the three prerequisites listed under Canadian corporate law, the 
Nigerian corporate law provides that the applicant must also show that the wrongdoers are 
the directors who are in control and will not take the necessary steps.206 This also means 
that the directors are the only proper defendants in a Nigerian derivative action, as the 
applicant has to show that the erring party is the director (s) and not the dominant 
shareholders. This is not the case under the CBCA. Thus, the Nigerian corporate law 
provides more prerequisites that an applicant must satisfy than the equivalent CBCA 
provision and so leaves the applicant with a more difficult task to face in order to obtain 
the remedy from the Nigerian courts.  
Also, the Nigerian derivative action provision narrows down the proper defendants to only 
the directors of the company which may be a serious hindrance for the adequate protection 
for minority shareholders. For instance, if the majority shareholders have voted for a certain 
decision that the minority shareholders believe is detrimental to the corporation, the 
minority shareholders may be unable to bring a derivative action on behalf of the 
corporation, subject to the discretion of the court on the basis that the directors are not the 
wrongdoers. 
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Conclusion 
 
The derivative action remedy is clearly a significant tool used in protecting the interests of 
minority shareholders in a corporation. By instituting an action on behalf of the 
corporation, minority shareholders are able to challenge decisions or actions taken by the 
directors to the detriment of the business or affairs of the company or remedy any wrong 
done to the corporation, irrespective of the historical rule in Foss v Harbottle. Although 
this remedy is one tailored towards protecting the interests of the company, as highlighted 
in this chapter, this remedy indirectly protects the rights of minority shareholders as well. 
In fact, the derivative provisions under both jurisdictions empower the courts to direct that 
any amount adjudged payable by a defendant in the action be paid wholly or in part to the 
applicant. The derivative action remedy provisions under Nigerian and Canadian corporate 
law are to a large extent very similar mainly because both were derived from 
recommendations made from the Jenkins Committee in relation to section 210 of the UK 
Companies Act of 1948.207However, the Canadian corporate statute has broadened the 
scope of its derivative action provisions and also provided more clarity. For example, the 
derivative action provision under the CBCA explicitly allows a minority shareholder to 
bring an action on behalf of the affiliate of the corporation in which it is a registered holder 
of security, while the CAMA does not. The mode of application for a derivative action 
under Canadian corporate law is also more flexible than what is applicable under the 
Nigerian corporate law, as the Nigerian courts will dismiss any action not brought in a form 
of an originating summons. The Canadian provision on derivative actions also appears to 
provide more details as to the period of notice required to be provided to the directors 
before instituting a derivative action, which is also not provided under the Nigerian 
corporate law. Furthermore, the CBCA also provides fewer prerequisites to instituting a 
derivative action than the Nigerian legal system, thereby reducing the hurdles that minority 
shareholders will have to face before instituting a derivative action. The above highlighted 
are features that the Nigerian policymakers and regulators can glean from Canadian 
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corporate law in order to provide and enhance an adequate and expedient remedy for 
minority shareholders who desire to rectify any wrong done to the corporation. 
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Chapter 3: Comparative Analysis of the Oppression Remedy under 
Nigerian and Canadian Corporate Law 
Introduction 
 
This chapter reviews the oppression remedy available under the Nigerian and Canadian 
corporate statutes, so as to examine the extent to which the legal provisions adequately 
protect minority shareholders in a corporation in each jurisdiction. This chapter also 
highlights the differences between both corporate law regimes and analyses the impact 
these differences have on minority shareholders’ protection in their respective 
jurisdictions.  
The oppression remedy is the most extensive and flexible remedy that is designed to 
remedy wrongs done to individual shareholders or a class or group of shareholders of a 
corporation. And so, it is only reasonable to examine its provisions and the interpretation 
of the courts, in order to get a clear picture of how minority shareholders are protected in 
a corporation. 
3. Remedy for Oppressive or Unfairly Prejudicial Conduct under Nigerian 
Company Law 
3.1. Introduction 
 
The current oppression remedy is embodied in Section 310 – 312 of the CAMA. This 
provision was enacted in response to the inadequacy of the oppression remedy provisions 
available under the Nigerian Companies Act of 1968 (the “1968 Act”). Section 408 and 
410 enable a shareholder to bring a petition to wind up the company on the ground that it 
is just and equitable that the company be wound up. However, this is not a remedy that 
many shareholders are willing to explore especially because it will bring the end to a 
company that they have invested in, which is not usually their objective.208 In view of this, 
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special provisions were made in the Companies Act 1968 to serve as an alternative to the 
winding-up remedy. 
Section 210 of the 1968 Act provided that an oppressed minority shareholder may apply 
to the court for an order that the “court may deem fit”. This provision did not specifically 
state the orders the court may give in such circumstances. This provision was a replica of 
the UK Companies Act of 1948 and surprisingly, was adopted in Nigeria in 1968 when the 
oppression remedy had already proved inadequate in England as a result of the strict 
approach and interpretation of the provision by the English judiciary.209As a result of the 
vagueness of the orders the court could make as a remedy, this provision seemed 
inadequate as it continued to be linked with the liquidation of the company at the instance 
of the oppressed minority – the very link that the legislators were trying to avoid in the 
first place.210 
In 1990, the Nigerian Law Reform Commission acknowledged the inadequacy of this 
section and recommended a more comprehensive provision that would state the exact 
powers of the court and accommodate both oppressive and unfairly prejudicial 
conduct.211Hence, section 310 – 312 of CAMA 2004 provides for relief that may be made 
on the ground that the affairs of the company are being conducted in an oppressive or 
unfairly prejudicial manner or that the interests of the shareholders are unfairly 
disregarded. 
3.1.1. Persons Entitled to bring an Application under Section 310-312 CAMA 
 
The CAMA empowers the following persons to file a petition in court for relief on the 
ground that the affairs of the company are being conducted in an illegal or oppressive or 
unfairly prejudicial manner or in a manner that is unfairly discriminatory against them:212 
a) A member of the company;  
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b) A director or officer or former director or officer of the company; 
c) A creditor;  
d) The Corporate Affairs Commission; or 
e) Any other person who, in the discretion of the court, is the proper person to 
make an application.  
The CAMA defines a “member” of a company limited by shares as a person who has at 
least one share in the company and who agreed in writing to become a member and has 
his name entered into the register of members.213 Thus, a member includes a minority 
shareholder of a corporation irrespective of the value of shares he has. It is also important 
to note that for the purpose of this remedy, the word “member” is defined to include the 
personal representatives of a deceased person and any person to whom shares have been 
transferred or transmitted by operation of law. In line with the objectives of this thesis, the 
focus will be on the relief sought by members of the company or by the Corporate Affairs 
Commission (“CAC”) on behalf of members of the company. 
3.1.2. Grounds for Application 
 
The grounds for seeking an oppression remedy under CAMA are as follows: 
i) that the affairs of the company are being conducted in a manner that is 
oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to, or unfairly discriminatory against, a 
member or members, or in a manner that is in disregard of the interests of a 
member or the members as a whole or any person authorized to bring an action 
under the section;214 or   
ii) that an act or omission or a proposed act or omission, by or on behalf of the 
company or a resolution, or a proposed resolution, of a class of members, was 
or would be oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to, or unfairly discriminatory 
against, a member or was or would be in a manner which is in disregard of the 
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interests of a member or the members as a whole or any person authorized to 
bring an action under the section.215 
In view of the voting method that occurs in companies, i.e. the one share - one vote system, 
this provision is designed to protect minority shareholders whose interests or rights may 
be violated because they lack the voting power required to direct the resolutions of the 
company in their favor or to protect their interests. Thus, in such instances where their 
status as minority shareholders has put them in a precarious position, the law steps in to 
protect them by empowering them to bring an application under the above-listed grounds. 
The CAC may also institute an oppression action on the ground that:  
(i) the affairs of the company are being conducted in a manner that is oppressive 
or unfairly prejudicial to, or unfairly discriminatory against a member or 
members or in a manner which is in disregard of the public interest; or  
(ii) any actual or proposed act or omission of the company (including an act or 
omission on its behalf) which was or would be oppressive, or unfairly 
prejudicial to, or unfairly discriminatory against a member or members in a 
manner which is in disregard of the public interests.216 
This provision is designed to protect both members of a company and members of the 
public at large. For instance, an oppressed minority shareholder (s) who does not have the 
resources to bring an action in court or for any other reason may request the CAC to 
institute an action on behalf of the oppressed minority shareholders. The CAC may also on 
its own volition bring an action against a company on the ground that it disregards the 
interest of the public. However, it is surprising that despite the extremely broad powers of 
the CAC to seek redress for oppressed minority shareholders and the public, this power has 
remained unutilized by the CAC.217 Perhaps, many minority shareholders do not request 
for such interference as a result of the lack of trust in the expertise of the CAC to adequately 
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protect their interests. Thus, most cases in which relief for oppression is sought have been 
instituted at the instance of minority shareholders and not the CAC.218 
3.1.3. Definition of Oppressive or Unfairly Prejudicial Conduct 
 
The CAMA does not define or provide guidance on what will constitute an “oppressive” or 
“unfairly prejudicial” conduct or an act that will be seen as disregarding the interests of a 
minority shareholder. Therefore, recourse must be made to the interpretation provided by 
the Nigerian courts. In this regard, the Nigerian courts have to a large extent relied on the 
judicial interpretation by English courts of the terms “oppression” and “unfair prejudice” 
in relation to section 210 of the UK Companies Act of 1948 which was the section 
corresponding to section 210 of the Nigerian Companies Act 1968.  
The English Court of Appeal in Re Jermyn Street Turkish Baths Ltd219 (which is still a valid 
persuasive authority in Nigeria) defined “oppression” as follows: 
Oppression occurs when shareholders having a dominant position in a company, 
either (i) exercise that power to procure that something is done or not done in 
the conduct of the company’s affairs or (ii) procure by an express or implicit 
threat of an exercise of that power that something is not done in the conduct of 
the company’s affairs, and when such conduct is unfair, burdensome, harsh and 
wrongful to the other members of the company or some of them, and lacks the 
degree of probity which they are entitled to expect in the conduct of the 
company’s affairs. 
In line with the above judicial interpretation, in Ogunade v Mobile Films (WA) Ltd,220 
Kabiri Whyte J. explained the nature of oppressive acts in contemplation of Section 210 of 
the Nigerian Companies Act 1968. He noted that “the oppression or fraudulent conduct of 
the majority must be harsh, burdensome and wrongful”221 and must represent a consistent 
pattern of conduct intentionally directed at the oppressed minority over a period of time. 
The court further stated that negligence in conducting the affairs of a company, or lack of 
business ability or inefficiency will not be sufficient to make the court grant relief under 
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Section 210 of the Nigerian Companies Act 1968.222 The problem with the explanation 
ascribed to oppressive acts under Section 210 of the Nigerian Companies Act 1968 was the 
need to establish that the oppressive conduct was a continuous pattern of conduct 
intentionally directed to the oppressed shareholder. Hence, where minority shareholders’ 
rights have been violated by singular conduct, the court may not hold such to be 
“oppressive” because it was not a continuous act. Therefore, the inclusion of the phrase 
“unfairly prejudicial” by the legislators in Section 311 of the CAMA was a great move from 
a restrictive to a broader approach, thereby enabling the court to be more flexible in 
interpreting the term to adequately protect minority shareholders irrespective of whether 
the act was continuous or singular conduct.223 
Just like the word “oppression”, the CAMA also does not provide a definition of the phrase 
“unfair prejudice” and, as such, recourse is to be made to the judicial interpretation of the 
phrase. The court held in Re R.A Noble & Sons (Clothing) Ltd224 that the test for unfairness 
is objective and there is no need to show any conscious knowledge on the part of the 
controller that it was unfair, or any other evidence of bad faith. The question would be 
whether a reasonable bystander would regard the act or omission as unfairly 
prejudicial.225An example of where the Nigerian court has granted this remedy was in a 
circumstance where the minority shareholders alleged that the company had not held any 
company meeting or filed annual returns with the CAC years after the company was 
incorporated. The minority shareholders also alleged that the company was being run by 
the majority shareholders leaving them in the dark as regards the financial status of the 
company.  The court held that this was a clear case where section 311 of CAMA could be 
invoked as a basis of action.226 The basis upon which the court decided that section 311 
applies was not clearly stated, neither was there any analysis as to the factors the courts 
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should look out for in deciding whether such act is oppressive, unfairly prejudicial or 
unfairly disregards the rights of the shareholder. 
In Aero Bell Nig Ltd v Fidelity Union Merchant Bank Ltd,227 the court had to decide whether 
the act of declaring a lower dividend than previously declared by the board amounted to 
unfair prejudice to the plaintiffs (who were former shareholders). The court held that the 
plaintiffs were entitled to bring an action for relief from unfairly prejudicial conduct 
regardless of the fact that they had sold their shares. This was because the unpaid dividend 
had accrued before the sale of their shares was consummated. Again, the court did not give 
any analysis or guideline that it followed in reaching this decision. In the words of the 
court, the petitioners had amply demonstrated that they were entitled to dividends due to 
them as at the date of the board meeting and not the dividends subsequently pronounced.228 
Perhaps the court based its decision on the reasonable expectation that the former 
shareholders had that they would receive a certain dividend and then such expectations 
were dashed by the declaration of another dividend. Even if this were the basis upon which 
the court decided this case, it was not clearly stated.  
The question that arises is whether there is a certain kind of harm or impact of such acts 
that should be present before the court would apply section 311. Or are the courts more 
likely to apply section 311 where the act is one that relates to the returns of investments of 
the shareholders in the company? In the face of the broad statutory language, the Nigerian 
courts have yet to establish clear cut rules to determine when an oppressive and unfairly 
prejudicial act has occurred. It appears that prevailing in the case of genuinely “oppressive 
acts” is easy since “oppression” “connotes harsh and wrongful acts that affect the rights of 
the shareholders”.229 However, with respect to “unfairly prejudicial” acts, the term 
comprises a broad range of corporate misconducts which are dependent on whether the 
court is of the opinion that such acts qualify as “unfair prejudice”. This then leads to a 
situation whereby shareholders who intend to bring an action under section 311 of the 
CAMA are uncertain about the likely decision of the court since there are no judicial 
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precedents setting out guidelines which the courts follow in reaching such judgments. This 
uncertainty may operate to discourage minority shareholders to use this right which 
eventually also decreases the likelihood that dominant shareholders and directors will have 
appropriate incentives to respect minority shareholders’ rights.230 Perhaps a more specific 
legislative reform or clear guidelines formulated by the courts will address this problem. 
However, legislative reform setting out factors to guide the court may still not capture every 
circumstance especially in view of the broad nature of corporate misconducts; however, 
guidelines established by the courts may be revised upon reviewing the facts of each case 
as the need arises.  
3.2. Relief by the court 
 
Where the court is satisfied that a petition under Section 310 and 311 of CAMA is well-
founded, it may make such order or orders as it thinks fit to bring relief in respect of the 
matter complained of. The court could make an order as serious as one for winding up of 
the company or directing that the company institute a specific proceeding or that the CAC 
carries out an investigation on the company. For most minority shareholders, winding up 
the company or exposing it to investigation by the CAC is not their objective. Rather they 
wish to obtain a remedy or prevent any breach of their rights that could result in a 
depreciation of their investments. Some other orders that the court is empowered to make 
which may be of more interest to minority shareholders are as follows:  
a) an order regulating the conduct of the affairs of the company in the future;  
b) for the purchase of the shares of any member by other members of the 
company;  
c) for the purchase of the shares of any member by the company and for the 
reduction accordingly of the company’s capital; 
d) varying or setting aside a transaction or contract to which the company is a 
party and compensating the company or any other party to the transaction or 
contract; 
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e) restraining a person from engaging in specific conduct or from doing a specific 
act or thing; or 
f) requiring a person to do a specific act or thing. 
The wording of the CAMA implies that the courts have the discretion to determine what 
remedies to provide the applicant and hence does not give the applicant the right to a 
specific remedy.  
The oppression remedy is one of the broadest remedies available for minority shareholders 
under the Nigerian corporate law system. With the inclusion of the words “unfair prejudice, 
disregard” and “discriminatory” in its provisions, it ensures that minority shareholders can 
bring an application for this remedy at the slightest violation of their legal rights or 
interests. Unlike the derivative action, this provision does not set out prerequisites to be 
fulfilled before instituting an action before the court. Upon assessing the application, the 
court is empowered to make a wide range of orders, including an order restraining a 
corporation from engaging in specific conduct or requiring that a corporation does a 
specific thing in order to remedy a wrong done to the minority shareholders in the company. 
However, there are no set out guidelines that can help applicants determine how the court 
will arrive at its conclusion or what specific orders the court will deem fit in any individual 
case and thus this remedy is to a large extent entirely within the discretion of the court.  
3.3. The Oppression Remedy under Canadian Corporate Law 
 
The oppression remedy has been described as one of the remedies under Canadian 
corporate law that gives the court extensive powers to redress all forms of unfair and 
oppressive actions by corporations and their directors to minority shareholders.231 It is a 
“flexible, far-reaching remedy”232 that allows any form of corporate behavior to be subject 
to judicial scrutiny.233It is an equitable remedy that seeks to ensure fairness to the minority 
shareholders, irrespective of their shareholding and voting powers in the corporation.234In 
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examining whether a conduct is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial, or unfairly disregards 
the interests of the shareholder, the courts may ignore the strict legal or statutory rights of 
the parties and the limits on those rights, in order to reach a fair judgment.235As aptly stated 
by the Supreme Court of Canada in Re BCE:236 
The oppression remedy focuses on harm to the legal and equitable 
interests of a wide range of stakeholders affected by oppressive acts 
of a corporation or its directors. This remedy gives a court a broad 
jurisdiction to enforce not just what is legal but what is fair. 
Oppression is also fact-specific: what is just and equitable is judged 
by the reasonable expectations of the stakeholders in the context and 
in regard to the relationships at play. 
The oppression remedy available under the CBCA was modeled after Section 210 of the 
UK Companies Act 1948 in accordance with the recommendations in the Dickerson 
Report. However, the members of the Dickerson committee went beyond the original 
English provision by addressing the weaknesses in the UK oppression remedy that had 
been identified by the Jenkins Committee.237 
Section 241 of the CBCA, reflecting the features recommended by the Dickerson 
committee, provides as follows:  
A complainant may apply to a court for an order under the section. If the court is 
satisfied that in respect of a corporation or any of its affiliates: 
(a) any act or omission of the corporation or any of its affiliates effects a result;  
(b) the business or affairs of the corporation or any of its affiliates are or have been 
carried on or conducted in a manner, or 
(c) the powers of the directors of the corporation or any of its affiliates are or have 
been exercised in a manner. 
that is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to or that unfairly disregards the interests 
of any security holder, creditor, director or officer, the court may make an order to 
rectify the matters complained of. 
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Simply put, a complainant may seek an oppression remedy on any of the above-listed 
grounds, which will be examined in the latter part of this chapter. 
3.3.1.  Who may bring an Oppression Action? 
 
Just as in the case of derivative actions, section 241 of the CBCA statutorily empowers a 
complainant to bring an action seeking this remedy. As noted above, section 238 of the 
CBCA defines a “complainant” to include: (a) a registered or beneficial owner and a former 
registered holder or beneficial owner, of a security of a corporation and any of its affiliates; 
(b) a director or an officer or a former director or officer of a corporation or any affiliates; 
(c) the CBCA Director; or (d) any other person who in the discretion of the court is a proper 
person to make an application under the section.  
3.3.2. Grounds under which Oppression Remedy may be sought 
 
a) “A corporate act or omission effects a result…” 
Section 241 (2) (a) of the CBCA provides that a complainant may bring an action for 
an oppression remedy where the corporation’s act or omission effects a result. Thus, 
it is not enough to show that the corporation has acted or omitted to do something; 
the complainant must also show that such acts or omission resulted in an outcome 
that is oppressive, unfairly prejudicial or unfairly disregards the interests of the 
complainant.238 
b) “The business or affairs of the corporation or any of its affiliates are or 
have been carried on…” 
Section 2 (1) of the CBCA defines “affairs” as the relationship among a corporation, 
its affiliates, shareholders, directors, and officers. The wording of Section 241 (2) 
provides for “business or affairs”, which means that a shareholder can seek an 
oppression remedy relating to all decisions of a corporation whether relating to the 
business of the corporation or the relationship among the corporation, affiliates, 
shareholders, and officers. This remedy will not be applicable, however, where for 
instance, the personal action of a director is not one that relates to the company’s 
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business or affairs or an exercise of his power as a director. In such instances where 
it relates to the personal action of the directors or where it is outside the scope of the 
affairs or business of the corporation, the court will not qualify it as a ground to seek 
an oppression remedy.239 
c) “The director's powers are exercised …” 
Section 241 (2) c of the CBCA provides that a complainant may institute an action 
under this provision where the powers of the directors are exercised in a manner that 
is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to, or unfairly disregards the interest of, the 
complainant. It is important to note even though the directors may have complied 
with their statutory powers, a complainant may still bring an oppression remedy 
without it affecting the complainant’s chance of obtaining the remedy, or precluding 
the judge from granting the remedy.240Most of the oppression cases usually arise from 
this ground, because of the wide statutory and fiduciary duties directors owe to the 
corporation.241For instance, section 122 of the CBCA provides that “every director 
and officer of a corporation in exercising their powers and discharging their duties 
shall act honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of the corporation; 
and exercise the care, diligence, and skill that a reasonably prudent person would 
exercise in comparable circumstances.” It is usually in the exercise of the director’s 
powers that they may breach their fiduciary duty, which is a ground for an affected 
minority shareholder to bring an oppression claim to the courts.242 
3.3.3. Interests protected by the Oppression Remedy 
 
No doubt the oppression remedy is widely resorted to when seeking protection for 
minority shareholders who may have been oppressed, unfairly prejudiced or had their 
interests unfairly disregarded. However, as wide as it may seem, this remedy does not 
cover every type of interest of the shareholders. In order to be protected by this remedy, a 
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minority shareholder must show that his affected interests qualify as “reasonable 
expectations” and that these reasonable expectations were thwarted in a way that 
constitutes oppression, unfair prejudice or unfair disregard of those interests.243 
The Supreme Court of Canada in Re BCE244 set out the factors to consider in an oppression 
suit. In this case, there was a plan of arrangement put in place for the purchase of the shares 
of BCE Inc. (“BCE”) by a consortium of purchasers by way of a leveraged buyout.  The 
arrangement was opposed by a group of debenture holders who complained that the trading 
value of their debentures would diminish by an average of 20% while conferring a premium 
of approximately 40% on the market price of BCE shares. In addressing the issues raised 
in this case, the Supreme Court set out a two-pronged test245 for determining whether a 
claim of oppression is made out by the complainant. The court stated as follows:  
In assessing a claim of oppression, a court must answer two questions: (1) 
Does the evidence support the reasonable expectation asserted by the 
claimant? and (2) Does the evidence establish that the reasonable 
expectation was violated by conduct falling within the terms “oppression”, 
“unfair prejudice” or “unfair disregard” of a relevant interest?246 
The sub-sections below will shed more light on the two-pronged tests carried out by the 
court to determine whether the oppression remedy will be available to a complainant.  
3.3.3.1. The Reasonable Expectations Test 
 
This then leads to the question – what is a reasonable expectations test? Although this 
phrase is not defined in the CBCA, according to the courts, the reasonable expectations 
test propounds that a complainant who may be a shareholder must show that the conduct 
being claimed as oppressive falls short of his reasonable expectations in relation to his 
investments in the corporation. 
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In Westfair Foods Ltd v Watt,247 the court explained what amounts to “reasonable 
expectations”: 
In very general terms, one clear principle that emerges is that we regulate 
voluntary relationships by regard to the expectations raised in the mind of a 
party, by the word or deed of the other, and which the first party ordinarily 
would realize it was encouraging by its words and deeds. This is what we 
call reasonable expectations, deserving of protection. 
This test is in line with the fundamental principles of corporate law that a minority 
shareholder expects that the directors and officers will comply with their statutory duties 
which may include maximizing profits and share value in order to meet the expectation of 
the shareholder.248 The courts recognize that a corporation is an entity that encompasses 
various individuals and groups whose rights and interests may conflict249and as such, it has 
been said that the oppression remedy will only avail shareholders where their reasonable 
expectations are not met and this would not include a “wish list” of the shareholder.250 
These “reasonable expectations” also include expectations that may have been created by 
the management of the corporation, whether legally binding or not. The court will usually 
apply an objective test to determine whether a reasonable expectation has been founded on 
the facts of the particular case.251 
The Supreme Court in Re BCE identified some factors that may guide a court in assessing 
whether or not a reasonable expectation has been founded on the facts of a given case.  
Thus, what is a reasonable expectation may depend on the following: (a) standard 
commercial practice; (b) size, nature and structure of the corporation; (c) relationships 
between the parties; (d) past practice of the corporation; (e) steps that the claimant could 
have taken to protect himself or herself; (f)  provisions of a shareholders’ agreement or 
other documents.252The Court found on the facts in that case that the expectation of the 
debentureholders that the directors would consider their position while making their 
decision was reasonable and had been met considering that the Board examined all its 
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options and acted in what it perceived to be in the best interests of the corporation.253 The 
Court noted that the debentureholders were not contending merely for a reasonable 
expectation that the Board consider their interests, but rather for an expectation that the 
Board preserve the market value of the debentures. And on this note, the court held that the 
reasonable expectations that the Board consider their interests were met and asking for 
anything more than this was outside the confines of the reasonable expectation test. As 
such, the oppression remedy available under section 241 of the CBCA did not apply. It is 
important to note that the list of factors relating to reasonable expectations referred to by 
the Supreme Court in BCE is not exhaustive, and as such, the scope of the oppression 
remedy continues to expand within the Canadian corporate law jurisprudence, thereby 
making it an indispensable tool in the hands of litigators seeking remedies for minority 
shareholders.254 
Another case where the court applied the “reasonable expectations” test was Downtown 
Eatery (1993) Ltd v Ontario,255where the plaintiff who was an employee of B Inc. had 
obtained judgment for damages for wrongful dismissal. Several years after the action was 
commenced there was a major reorganization of B Inc. with another company, D. Ltd. B 
Inc. and D Ltd. were related companies, and directors of B Inc. were also directors of D 
Ltd. The directors did not believe the plaintiff had a meritorious claim and claimed they 
did not reorganize to avoid judgment and so the judgment against B Inc. remained 
unsatisfied. The plaintiff then sued all of the companies in the group basing his claim, in 
part on the oppression remedy. At trial, the application was dismissed on the basis that 
since the amalgamation and reorganization were not undertaken for the purpose of 
defeating the plaintiff’s judgment, the employee was not entitled to an oppression remedy. 
On appeal, the Court of Appeal overturned the decision of the trial court and held that the 
intention of depriving the employee of judgment was not a prerequisite for an oppression 
remedy. The employee had reasonable expectations that the employer’s affairs would be 
                                                          
253Ibid at paras 96, 101. 
254Nicholls, supra note 13 at 432. 
255[2001] O.J. No. 1879, Ont. C.A. 
67 
 
 
conducted with a view to protecting his interests and the effect of the amalgamation was 
unfairly prejudicial and unfairly disregarded the employee’s interests.256 
From the above-reported cases, it is clear that the test adopted by the court in determining 
reasonable expectations is an objective one which also requires a balancing of the 
competing rights and interests of the stakeholders in the corporation in arriving at a 
decision. However, proof that reasonable expectations have not been met is not enough to 
avail a complainant the remedy under section 241. The court will further examine whether 
the violation of such reasonable expectations results in one of the statutory elements which 
will be examined below.  
3.3.3.2 Oppression, Unfairly prejudicial or Unfairly Disregards interests 
 
The court in Re BCE went on to note that the complainant must also show that the breach 
of the reasonable expectation caused harm in such a way as to meet one of the statutory 
components in Section 241 (2) of the CBCA, that is, oppression, unfair prejudice or unfair 
disregard. It is important to note that not every breach of reasonable expectations would 
amount to oppression, unfair disregard or unfair prejudice.257 While the first step – 
“reasonable expectations” - appears to be unambiguous in light of the factors listed and the 
test adopted by the courts in the above-reported cases, questions arise as to the type of harm 
or kinds of actions that would amount to oppression, unfair prejudice or unfair disregard  
of the rights of the complainants. Although some judges lump the interpretation or 
consequences of all three situations together for the sake of convenience, it is clear from 
the wording of Section 241 that each of these possibilities represents a separate cause of 
action.258It is then important to examine the kinds of behavior that would be characterized 
as oppressive or unfairly prejudicial conduct or conduct disregarding the interests of 
minority shareholders in a corporation. 
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In the case of Scottish Cooperative Wholesale Society Ltd v Meyer,259“oppressive” conduct 
has been defined as “burdensome, harsh or wrongful”. The definition of “oppressive 
conduct” that appears to be most cited by the Canadian courts and in legal writings is that 
provided by Lord Cooper in Elder v Elder & Watson Ltd,260 where he noted that for a 
conduct to be qualified as oppressive, it should at the “lowest involve a visible departure 
from the standards of fair dealing and a violation of the conditions of fair play on which 
every shareholder who entrusts his money to a company is entitled to rely.” A minority 
shareholder who has invested funds will have certain expectations. For instance, such 
shareholder will expect to receive notice of meetings of the members of the corporation 
and be able to vote on resolutions arising from such meetings, amongst other things. Now, 
where the directors or certain controlling shareholders violate these minority shareholder’s 
basic rights, the court will likely hold such conduct to be oppressive.261 
The phrase “unfairly prejudicial” has been taken to mean “acts that are unjustly or 
inequitably detrimental”,262 and is usually viewed as less offensive than oppressive acts. 
The test for whether a conduct is unfairly prejudicial to the rights of a minority shareholder 
is an objective test, whereby a reasonable bystander observing the conduct of the 
controlling shareholders or directors of the corporation would regard the conduct as having 
unfairly prejudiced the interests of the minority shareholder.263 Some examples of unfairly 
prejudicial conduct include squeezing out a minority shareholder, paying dividends 
without a formal declaration, failing to disclose related party transactions and changing 
corporate structure to drastically alter debt ratios.264 
“Unfair disregard” has been viewed as the least serious of the three wrongs referred to in 
Section 241 of the CBCA. This has been interpreted to mean “unjustly without cause, pay 
no attention to, ignore or treat as of no importance the interests of the shareholder.”265 It is 
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important to note that such disregard must be “unfair”, as a mere disregard of a minority 
shareholder’s rights will not suffice.266 This is because it is not unusual for corporate 
directors to treat the interests of one group of shareholders as more important than minority 
shareholders. But in doing so, they must strike a fair balance between the interests of 
various shareholders, including the minority shareholders’ interests.267In the case of 
Grigoriu v Ottawa-Carleton Standard Condominium Corp No 706,268a condominium 
corporation amended its declaration to prohibit the use of parking units by non-residents. 
The purpose of this amendment was to address security concerns caused by non-residents 
accessing the parking garage. This change adversely affected the rights of the applicant 
who owned a parking unit and a residential unit in a neighbouring condominium 
corporation and was unable to sell his residential condominium unit (in the neighbouring 
corporation) because he was unable to sell his parking unit along with it. The judge hearing 
the application found that the amendment to the declaration breached the owner's 
reasonable expectation of being able to sell his residential unit with his parking unit  and 
that the Board unfairly disregarded the interests of the applicant. It is pertinent to note that 
these statutory components and interpretations provided by the courts are merely 
illustrative and should not be regarded as “watertight compartments” as they often “overlap 
and intermingle”.269 
Unlike Nigerian courts, the Canadian courts provide some context (that is the two-pronged 
test articulated in Re BCE) as to how the court decides on whether Section 241 of CBCA 
will be applied. However, it has been said that with respect to the second stage of the test, 
there is not much analytical clarity as to how the courts arrive at these decisions.270 This is 
because unlike with the first prong of the test, the Supreme Court has yet to establish factors 
or guidelines or even requirements that should be met in determining whether the violation 
of reasonable expectations resulted in an oppression, unfair prejudice or unfair disregard 
of the interests of the complainant. This has left the lower courts a gap to fill in and could 
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then create some level of uncertainty in deciding oppression cases. In the case of Scullion 
v Munro,271for example, the plaintiff and Munro incorporated three companies together and 
were equal partners throughout the time in their business together. Munro, the defendant, 
alleged that the plaintiff made improper payments to himself over several years and as a 
result decided to end business with the plaintiff. Munro proceeded to remove the plaintiff’s 
personal belongings from the companies, denied him access to the companies and stopped 
paying his salary. The court held that the effect of Munro’s conduct was unfairly prejudicial 
to the plaintiff and he was entitled to relief pursuant to the oppression remedy. Although 
the court made mention of the case of Re BCE, it did not apply the two-pronged test nor 
did it provide an analysis of why the conduct amounted to unfair prejudice to the plaintiff’s 
interests. By applying an objective test, it is easy to see that there was a breach by Munro 
of the plaintiff’s reasonable expectations since the plaintiff was deprived of his financial 
benefit and access to the companies. However, with respect to the second prong of the test, 
it seems as though this is usually decided based on judicial precedents (where there are 
similar circumstances) or in the discretion of the courts, seeing that the courts do not 
provide any analysis that helps all parties understand whether the statutory components set 
out in the CBCA were met.272 
Unlike the first prong of the test where Canadian courts have set out an analysis and 
guidelines on how to arrive at whether or not the reasonable expectations of a shareholder 
have been violated,273 Canadian courts do not appear to do the same with the second prong 
of the test. The courts simply assert that certain actions or omissions are, or are not, 
oppressive, unfairly prejudicial or unfairly disregarding the interests of the applicant, 
without articulating principles that inform their conclusion. As a result, there seems to be 
a level of uncertainty about what specific acts the courts will regard as oppressive, unfairly 
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prejudicial or unfairly disregarding the interests of the shareholder since there are no laid 
down principles.274 
In a more recent case –Wilson v Alharayeri275- the CEO of the corporation who was also a 
shareholder, resigned when it was revealed that he failed to disclose a conflict of interest 
he had with the company. In response to the corporation’s financial difficulties, the board 
decided to complete a private placement to its existing common shareholders. Two of the 
directors advocated against converting the previous CEO’s shares on the basis of his 
conduct as the CEO. As a result of the private placement, issuing securities, the value of 
the CEO’s shares was greatly reduced, and the control of the two current directors was 
increased. The CEO then filed an application for oppression under section 241 of the 
CBCA. The court held that section 241 was applicable in this circumstance and that the two 
directors were personally liable for the oppressive conduct. The court set out four general 
principles that should guide the courts in determining whether to grant the remedy. First, 
the oppression remedy must in itself be a fair way of dealing with the situation. It seems 
fair to hold the two directors personally liable being that they had derived a personal benefit 
in the form of increased control of the corporation, and misused their corporate power by 
reducing the value of the previous CEO’s shares. Second, an order given by the courts 
should go no further than is necessary to rectify the oppression. Third, any order may serve 
only to vindicate the reasonable expectations of security holders, creditors, directors or 
officers in their capacity as corporate stakeholders. And fourth, a court should consider the 
general corporate law context in exercising its remedial discretion.  
It is important to note that the above guidelines regulate the discretionary powers of the 
court with respect to section 241 (3) of the CBCA, that is the orders the court can grant 
having established that section 241 (1) of the CBCA applies. However, the second prong 
of the test remains fact-specific and is very dependent on judicial discretion. Even though 
this is a common pattern among other equitable remedies provided by the court, providing 
guidelines with respect to the second prong of the test, just as in the first prong of the test, 
                                                          
274As highlighted above, the court in Re BCE set out a number of factors that can help the court determine 
whether the reasonable expectation of the complainant has been violated. 
275 [2017] SCC 39. 
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will help in strengthening minority shareholders’ protection. For instance, a minority 
shareholder is best protected where both directors and majority shareholders understand 
that certain conducts determined in accordance with clear principles and analysis laid down 
by the courts will amount to oppression, unfair prejudice or unfair disregard of the interests 
of the complainant and not based merely on whether a judge in a particular case might 
think so.  
Upon examining oppression remedy cases in Alberta, British Columbia and Ontario 
between 2015 and 2017 Girgis276 advises that two tests should be adopted with respect to 
the second prong of the test. First, the complainant must experience harm in its corporate 
role, arising from its relationship with the corporation, and the harm must be particular to 
the complainant’s interests and, secondly, other remedies cannot be capable of addressing 
the harm. Perhaps, it might also be beneficial to include in the test the existence of any 
harm negatively affecting the returns of the investments of a shareholder since that is the 
primary purpose of most investors who buy shares in a corporation. Even if these guidelines 
were officially established by the court, just like the “reasonable expectations” test, they 
would not constitute an exhaustive list of considerations but could nevertheless provide 
some level of clarity for complainants and restrict the exercise of discretion of the courts 
and create some level of certainty which is essential for a corporate law system that aims 
to adequately protect its minority shareholders’ rights and interests. 
3.4.  Remedies of the Court 
 
Where the complainant succeeds in satisfying the court that his interest is a “reasonable 
expectation” and that such interest has been violated in a way that constitutes oppression 
or unfair prejudice or unfair disregard, the court may then make an order to rectify the 
situation complained of. Section 241 (3) bestows very wide discretionary powers on the 
court to address these wrongs, as the very essence of the oppression remedy is to remedy 
any wrongs done to the complainant, not to decree punishment against the wrongdoers. In 
the words of Farley J, “[t]he job for the court is to even up the balance, not tip it in favour 
                                                          
276Girgis, supra note 270 at 488. 
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of the hurt party”.277The CBCA, just like CAMA, authorizes the court to make such orders 
as it deems fit. The Canadian corporate law, however, sets out in more specific terms the 
kinds of orders the court may make.  For example, the court may make an order requiring 
a corporation to produce to the court or interested person financial statements in a form 
prescribed by the CBCA or the court.278 The court may also order that the affairs of the 
corporation be regulated by amending the articles or by-laws or creating or amending a 
unanimous shareholder agreement.279 In addition to the orders set out under Nigerian 
corporate law, the CBCA also authorizes the court to make the following orders: 
a) an order directing an issue or exchange of securities; 
b) an order appointing directors in place of or in addition to all or any of the 
directors then in office; 
c) an order directing a corporation or any other person, to pay a security holder 
any part of the monies that the security holder paid for securities, provided that 
the company has the financial capability and would not, as a consequence of 
such payment of monies to a security holder, become insolvent thereafter;  
d) an order compensating an aggrieved person;  
e) an order directing rectification of the registers or other records of the 
corporation; and 
f) an order requiring the trial of any issue. 
 
The broadness and flexibility of the Canadian oppression remedy make it a necessary tool 
in protecting minority shareholders in a corporation. This is so because the CBCA gives the 
courts unlimited powers to redress all sorts of unfairness and oppressive actions, whether 
legal or equitable. Commenting on the flexibility of this remedy, S.M Beck 280 described the 
Canadian oppression remedy as “the broadest, most comprehensive and most open-ended 
shareholder remedy in the common law world.”281 This can be seen in Section 241 (3) of 
the CBCA which allows the court to grant any order it deems fit to rectify the matters 
complained of.  
                                                          
27782099 Ontario Inc v Harold E Ballard [1991] 3 BLR (3d) 113 at 186 (Ont Ct Gen Div).   
278 Section 241 (3) (i) of the CBCA. 
279 This is as opposed to the Nigerian corporate law which simply provides that the court may make an order 
for regulating the conduct of the affairs of the company in future. 
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3.5. Comparative Analysis of the Nigerian and Canadian Oppression Remedy 
 
This section will conduct a comparative analysis of the oppression remedy available under 
the CAMA and CBCA. Although most of the oppression remedy provisions of both 
jurisdictions are very similar, there are certain differences that are worth highlighting. For 
instance, while the CAMA permits members and other stakeholders to commence an 
oppression remedy action only against the corporation, its directors or officers, the CBCA 
permits members of the corporation to bring such action against the corporation, its, 
directors and officers, and any of its affiliates. Also, the CAMA makes provision for 
anticipatory oppression such that an applicant can institute an oppression remedy action 
for a proposed act or omission. The CBCA, on the other hand, does not have this provision. 
Another significant difference between the two legal systems is the interpretation adopted 
by the courts in the respective jurisdictions. While the Canadian courts have set out detailed 
guidelines that the courts take into consideration in deciding an oppression remedy case, 
the Nigerian courts have yet to lay down any form of guideline to help all parties decide 
whether the oppression remedy will apply. For example, the Canadian courts have adopted 
the use of the reasonable expectations test in deciding whether an act or omission is 
oppressive, unfairly prejudicial or unfairly disregarding of the interests of the complainant, 
while the Nigerian courts have no expressly set out test that can assist parties decide how 
the courts will exercise this discretionary power. 
3.5.1. Proper Parties to Seek the Oppression Remedy 
 
Just as under the derivative action provision, section 241 of the CBCA empowers a 
complainant to seek the oppression remedy with respect to acts or omissions by the 
affiliates of the corporation in which it is a registered or beneficial holder of a security.282 
The CAMA, on the other hand, does not explicitly provide for such powers that will allow 
an applicant to institute this remedy against an affiliate of the corporation of which it is a 
registered holder of a security unless the court uses its discretion to allow such action.283 
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The recent Bill passed by the House of Senate which extends the application of the Nigerian 
derivative action to affiliates does not include similar changes to the oppression remedy 
provision. The reason for permitting such recourse under the derivative action provision 
and not yet under the oppression remedy is not clear. Perhaps, it is an omission by the 
legislators, as there seems to be no reasonable reason why this provision should not also 
be extended to cover affiliates of the corporations in which the shareholder is a registered 
holder of securities. The implication of this is that the court may prevent shareholders from 
applying for this remedy in relation to acts or omissions of an affiliate of the corporation 
in which it is a shareholder because of the strict adherence to its locus standi principle.284 
In doing so, this may be prejudicial to the personal rights of minority shareholders 
especially in instances where the supposed affiliate is the financial backbone of the 
corporation and minority shareholders are unable to bring an application against the 
directors where they have mismanaged its funds.  
3.5.2. Anticipatory Oppression Suits 
 
An interesting point under the Nigerian oppression remedy is that its provision allows an 
applicant to seek relief for anticipatory or threatened oppression. The CAMA provides that 
an applicant can seek this remedy for a proposed act or omission or resolution that would 
be oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to or discriminatory against a member.285 This 
provision is put in place to prevent a violation of that minority shareholder’s rights, such 
that they can seek this remedy even when their rights are yet to be violated, but when they 
understand such imminent act or omission or resolution will amount to oppression or 
disregard of their interests. The CBCA does not have any provision for anticipatory 
oppression claims.286In Sparling c. Javelin International Lte287the court refused to make an 
order because the matter complained of was an apprehension of future oppression. In 
interpreting section 234 of the CBCA (now 241), the court noted that it was allowed to 
“make orders to rectify the matters complained of and not to remedy injustices which have 
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not yet occurred and which may never occur”.288 In other words, the Canadian courts (in 
interpreting section 241 of the CBCA) are of the view that any order of rectification should 
only address injustices which have occurred, not those that may only be feared as possibly 
happening in the future. However, Morritt et al are of the view that where there are 
reasonable grounds to believe that damage will occur if an order is not granted, the broad 
statutory authority to grant oppression relief exists.289 
3.5.3. The Reasonable Expectation Rule 
 
One of the significant developments of the Canadian oppression remedy is the adoption of 
the reasonable expectations test. This is a device applied by the Canadian courts in 
interpreting the oppression remedy provisions available under the CBCA and other 
provincial corporate law statutes. The application of this test gives a wider approach to 
protecting minority shareholders, such that clear bargains or expectations of parties to a 
corporate contract or compact not found in the legal documents guiding contracting parties 
can also be enforced. Also, the adoption of this test has to a great extent provided some 
level of certainty for all actors in the Canadian corporate environment. This is because the 
concept of the “reasonable expectations” test means that specific conduct can be found to 
be oppressive, unfairly prejudicial or unfairly disregarding of interests only if it violates 
the reasonable expectation of the complainant. In other words, a reasonable expectation 
has to be established first before the courts will determine whether or not the oppression 
remedy will avail the applicant.  
The “reasonable expectations” test is a very important tool in light of the broadness of the 
oppression remedy, such that it helps to narrow the applicability of the broad legislation 
which may otherwise give rise to uncertainty, inconsistency, and confusion if care is not 
taken. Also, this test is in line with the principles of corporate law that a minority 
shareholder expects that the directors and officers will comply with their statutory duties 
which may include maximizing profits and share value in order to meet the expectation of 
                                                          
288Ibid at para 407. 
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the shareholder.290This judicial tool is however not used by the Nigerian courts in deciding 
whether the oppression remedy applies in a given case. In fact, there is yet to be any laid 
down guidelines by the Nigerian courts in interpreting this extremely wide remedy. This 
then leads to a clear case of uncertainty for all parties because no one can clearly understand 
the basis upon which the courts may decide that the oppression remedy applies. It is even 
possible that the Nigerian court may refuse to grant such remedy based on “judicial 
discretion” even where the reasonable expectations of the applicant have been violated. 
Therefore, it is recommended that the Nigerian courts adopt this test as it not only provides 
certainty for the interpretation of the oppression remedy but also goes to support the 
fundamental principles of corporate law. 
Having highlighted the differences between the oppression remedy provided under each of 
CAMA and the CBCA, it is clear that statutory provisions provided under the CAMA are 
not significantly different from the oppression remedy provisions available under the 
CBCA. However, the significant difference lies in the interpretation provided by the courts 
under the respective jurisdictions. The Canadian courts set out more details and guidance 
by adopting the reasonable expectations test in interpreting the oppression remedy 
provision, while the Nigerian courts have no laid down guideline or test that assists in such 
interpretation. While the oppression remedy provisions under both jurisdictions were 
derived from section 210 of the U.K Companies Act 1948, the Canadian oppression remedy 
has evolved to a higher level of sophistication by enlarging the scope of the remedy291 and 
setting out tests and factors that can help parties decide whether the reasonable expectations 
of the applicant have been violated or not, so as to further determine whether the oppression 
remedy applies. The Nigerian oppression remedy, on the other hand, still mirrors section 
210 of the U.K Companies Act with slight changes and the Nigerian judiciary does not 
provide any form of analysis that can provide some guidance on how the courts will 
exercise their judicial discretion. No doubt, there is need for the Nigerian corporate system 
to catch up with these “Canadian-inspired” changes and tests adopted by the Canadian 
                                                          
290Re BCE, supra note 236 at para 64. 
291 For instance, the Canadian oppression remedy allows a complainant to institute an action against the 
corporation and its affiliates.  
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courts, in order to provide more clarity for oppression remedy cases, and thereby improve 
the minority shareholders’ protection regime.292 
Conclusion 
 
As highlighted above, the oppression remedy is an equitable and far-reaching remedy that 
allows the court to remedy any form of corporate wrong done to the minority shareholder. 
It looks beyond the provisions set out in the statutes and ensures that shareholders are 
adequately protected where an act or omission is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial or if such 
act unfairly disregards the interest of the shareholder.  
The oppression remedy provisions under both Nigerian and Canadian corporate law are very 
similar in form; however, it appears that the Canadian corporate system allows for a more 
extensive approach than the Nigerian legal system. For instance, while the CBCA allows a 
shareholder to bring an application for an oppression remedy in respect of an act or omission 
by the affiliate of the corporation, the CAMA does not explicitly do so. The CBCA also 
provides more details on the grounds upon which an oppression remedy may be brought, 
i.e., where the act effects a result or where the business or affairs of the corporation or 
director’s powers are exercised in an oppressive manner.  
The CAMA, on the other hand, provides that the remedy can be sought when the affairs or 
act or omission or proposed resolution will amount to oppression. Aside from the few 
differences between their legislation, a significant difference between both legal systems is 
the broad interpretation given to this provision by Canadian courts. The introduction of the 
concept of “reasonable expectations” by the courts in assessing these claims allows this 
provision to accommodate more than just legal expectations but reasonable expectations 
that could have been anticipated from the interaction among stakeholders of the corporation. 
While the Nigerian courts may have applied this test in a number of cases, it is not one 
clearly pronounced or set out as a standard for the Nigerian courts in deciding oppression 
                                                          
292 As highlighted above, where there is a laid down test or guideline in relation to equitable remedies, it 
provides some level of certainty for all parties involved. And minority shareholders are better protected where 
directors and other stakeholders in the corporation based on previous laid down tests, understand that certain 
acts violate the minority shareholders’ reasonable expectations. 
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cases.  And therefore it is important that the Nigerian courts clearly pronounce this test and 
guidelines to assist in determining whether an oppression remedy applies in any given case. 
This will then provide a level of certainty for all parties, such that minority shareholders and 
other stakeholders understand that certain acts may be declared a violation of the reasonable 
expectations of the minority shareholder (s) or any other stakeholder, as the case may be.  
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Chapter 4: Solving the Predicament 
Introduction 
 
The previous chapters set out a comparative analysis of minority shareholders' protection 
(derivative action and oppression remedy) under Nigerian and Canadian corporate law. It 
highlighted the flaws in the legislative provisions and judicial interpretations of both 
remedies under the respective jurisdictions and concluded that some of the legal provisions 
and rigid interpretations provided by the Nigerian courts compared to Canadian courts can 
hinder the corporate law system from providing adequate protection for minority 
shareholders in a Nigerian corporation. This chapter will summarize in table form, key 
points of comparison between the derivative action and the oppression remedy under 
Nigerian and Canadian corporate law regimes that have been identified in the previous 
chapters.  
Furthermore, this chapter concludes that there are not many significant differences in the 
statutory provisions relating to the Nigerian and Canadian minority shareholders’ 
protection. Yet, there are different outcomes in the application of minority shareholders’ 
protection in both countries (with minority shareholders in Nigeria enjoying less 
protection) because of different patterns of enforcement. Therefore, this chapter places 
more emphasis on enforcement errors and systematic inefficiencies that could affect 
minority shareholders’ protection under the Nigerian corporate law regime.  
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4.1. Derivative Action under Nigerian and Canadian Corporate law 
The derivative action is embodied in 238 and 239 of the CBCA and section 309 and 303 of 
the CAMA respectively, with both provisions being substantially similar. The table below 
will summarize the differences between the provisions identified in the previous chapters. 
 
S/N 
 
 
CBCA 
 
 
CAMA 
1.  Section 238 of the CBCA lists the 
categories of persons authorized to 
bring a derivative action. The CBCA 
authorizes a shareholder of a 
corporation or any of its affiliates to 
bring a derivative action on behalf of 
a corporation or any of its 
subsidiaries. 
Section 309 of the CAMA lists the 
categories of persons authorized to 
bring a derivative action. Unlike the 
CBCA, it does not explicitly 
authorize a shareholder of a 
corporation to bring a derivative 
action on behalf of its affiliates and 
vice versa.    
2.  Section 248 of the CBCA provides 
that a derivative action may be 
commenced in a summary manner 
but also leaves in the discretion of 
the party seeking the remedy to 
proceed by way of action. Most 
importantly, the courts have also 
pronounced that they will not set 
aside the originating process on the 
ground of wrong mode of 
commencement. 
Rule 2 (1) & (2) of the Companies 
Proceedings Rules provides that all 
applications, including the derivative 
action must be brought by 
originating summons. The Nigerian 
courts have rejected applications not 
brought in this form. 
3.  Section 239 (2) (a) of the CBCA 
requires a complainant to show he 
has given notice of not less than 14 
days to the directors of the 
The CAMA requires the applicant to 
show that he has given reasonable 
notice to the directors of his intention 
to file an application for a derivative 
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corporation informing them of his 
intention of instituting a derivative 
action. The CBCA also allows the 
court to use its discretion where the 
complainant is unable to give the 
stipulated notice period. 
action on behalf of the company. The 
CAMA does not define the term 
“reasonable notice”. 
4.  The CBCA sets out three 
prerequisites that a complainant 
must satisfy before leave to 
commence a derivative action can be 
granted by the court. The 
complainant must show that he has 
provided at least 14 days’ notice to 
the directors, that he is acting in good 
faith and he is acting in the best 
interest of the corporation. 
The CAMA sets out 4 prerequisites 
an applicant must satisfy before a 
leave to commence a derivative 
action can be granted by the court. In 
addition to the prerequisites provided 
under the CBCA, the applicant is also 
required to show that the wrong 
doers are the directors who are in 
control and will not take the 
necessary steps to sue. In other 
words, this remedy may not cover 
minority shareholders in cases where 
the dominant shareholders are the 
wrong doers. 
 
4.1.1. Recommendations relating to the Nigerian derivative action 
4.1.1.1. Party to Institute a derivative action 
 
As highlighted in the second chapter of this thesis, the Companies and Allied Matters 
(Repeal and Re-enactment) Bill which is yet to be made into law, allows shareholders of a 
corporation to bring a derivative action on behalf of the subsidiary of the corporation. 
Hopefully, this bill will be passed into law so that shareholders of a corporation can remedy 
any wrong done to a subsidiary of the corporation in which it is a registered holder of a 
security.  
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4.1.1.2. Mode of Commencement of Derivative Action 
 
The Nigerian Companies Proceeding Rules could be amended to allow the applicant to 
decide the mode of commencement, so long as the conditions precedent for a derivative 
action required under CAMA are fulfilled. The word “shall” used under Rule 2 (1) of the 
Nigerian Companies Proceedings Rules should be amended to read “may” to imply that 
the applicant has the discretion to bring an application for a derivative action in any other 
mode. Furthermore, there is a need to also provide language similar to what is available 
under Rule 2.01 (2) of the Ontario Civil Procedure Rules which provides that the “court 
shall not set aside an originating process on the ground that the proceeding should have 
been commenced by an originating process other than the one employed”.293 This will make 
it very clear to the courts that the intention of the legislators is to eradicate such 
unreasonable adherence to technicality. This will also enable the courts to adopt a flexible 
approach just like the Canadian courts in interpreting the provisions of the Companies 
Proceeding Rules. However, in the absence of such amendment (especially because the 
Nigerian legislators do not turn around amendments frequently), the Nigerian courts should 
overlook such technicality and adopt the more flexible approach of the Canadian courts, so 
long as the non-compliance relates to the form and not the substance of the application. 
4.1.1.3. Notice to Directors 
 
It is recommended that the Nigerian legislature adopt the provision relating to the notice to 
directors in the CBCA by setting out a specific notice period. It should also set out 
provisions allowing the court to use its discretion in urgent situations where irreparable 
damage may be done to the interests of the corporation if no derivative action is brought 
before the mandatory notice period to directors required under the law. 
4.1.1.4. Conditions Precedent to Bringing Derivative Actions  
 
It is recommended that the additional condition in the CAMA which requires the applicant 
to show that the wrongdoers are the directors, who are in control and will not take the 
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84 
 
 
necessary steps,294 should be removed from the derivative action provisions under CAMA. 
This is because it clearly connotes that the directors are the only proper defendants in a 
Nigerian derivative action. However, there may be instances where the wrongdoers may 
be the dominant shareholders and not the directors, or the wrongdoers maybe both the 
directors and dominant shareholders. It is important that this provision be removed so as 
not to create further restrictions on shareholders who want to institute a derivative action 
on behalf of the corporation. 
4.2. Oppression Remedy under Nigerian and Canadian Corporate Law 
 
The oppression remedy is set out in section 241 of the CBCA and section 310-312 of the 
CAMA respectively. Just as with the derivative action, both provisions are very similar. 
The table below will summarize the few key differences between the respective provisions 
and the interpretations provided by the courts in the respective jurisdictions: 
S/N CBCA CAMA 
1. Section 241 explicitly empowers a 
complainant to seek the oppression 
remedy with respect to acts or 
omission by the corporation or any of 
its affiliates.  
Section 311 of the CAMA does not 
explicitly empower a member of a 
corporation to seek an oppression 
remedy against its affiliate and vice 
versa. 
2. The CBCA does not expressly 
provide for anticipatory oppressive 
claims. In fact, the Canadian courts 
are of the view that any order of 
rectification should only be made to 
address injustices which have 
occurred and not those feared to 
possibly happen in the future. 
Section 311 (2) of the CAMA allows an 
applicant to bring an action for a 
proposed act or omission that would be 
oppressive, unfairly prejudicial or 
discriminatory against the applicant.  
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3.  In determining whether an 
oppression remedy will be granted, 
the Canadian courts have adopted the 
reasonable expectations test. The 
application of the test offers broad 
protection to shareholders, such that 
clear bargains and even expectations 
of parties not found in the legal 
documents can be enforced by the 
courts on the basis that the 
complainant reasonably expected 
certain treatment. 
The reasonable expectations test is not 
applied in deciding oppression remedy 
cases in Nigerian courts. 
 
4.2.1. Recommendation for Nigerian Oppression Remedy 
4.2.1.1 Party to Institute an Oppression remedy action 
 
As highlighted in chapter 3, the recent Companies and Allied Matters (Repeal and Re-
enactment) Bill passed by the Nigerian legislators does not permit an applicant to bring an 
oppression action against the affiliate of the corporation in which it is a registered holder 
of a security.295 It, however, does permit an applicant to institute a derivative action against 
the affiliate of a corporation. Apparently, the failure to extend application of the oppression 
remedy to affiliates is an omission and it is recommended that the Nigerian legislators 
amend this provision before it is passed into law, so that defendants in an oppression 
remedy suit that are subsidiaries or affiliates of the corporation in which the applicant is a 
registered holder of security do not use this provision to their advantage and prevent 
liability where they have erred.  In the event that it is not amended and the Bill is passed 
into law, the courts should use their discretion to allow such claims against the affiliates 
since there seems to be no reasonable reason why actions in respect of affiliates should not 
                                                          
295Section 352 of the Repeal and Re-enactment Bill. 
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be permitted in the case of the oppression remedy just as they are in the case of derivative 
actions. 
4.2.1.2. Reasonable Expectations Test or Analysis 
 
Another area of the minority shareholders’ regime that needs reform is the uncertainty of 
the test for liability under the oppression remedy. It is recommended that the courts adopt 
the “reasonable expectations” test adopted by the Canadian courts and provide analysis in 
deciding whether the oppression remedy will apply. This will help provide some level of 
clarity and certainty.296Where the applicability of this remedy is clear, then all stakeholders 
in a corporation understand that certain acts analyzed in accordance with guidelines laid 
down will amount to oppression, unfair prejudice or unfair disregard of minority 
shareholders’ interests. This would also serve as a precaution to directors and controlling 
shareholders who understand that the court will apply the same guidelines and provide the 
remedy to the minority shareholders if such acts or omissions occur.  
 
4.3. Policy Implications 
 
Introduction 
The previous chapter set out the statutory provisions of the derivative action and oppression 
remedy under the Nigerian and Canadian corporate law. The analysis shows that the 
statutory provisions of both jurisdictions seem to be very similar with not many significant 
differences as highlighted in the tables above. However, this section argues that, in practice, 
minority shareholders in Nigeria enjoy less protection perhaps suggesting that there are 
other factors other than statutory provisions that really account for the differences in the 
protection provided to shareholders in the respective jurisdictions. 
Research has shown that there is a strong correlation between investor protections, 
dispersed shareholdings, and economic development.297More importantly, research has 
also shown that without adequate enforcement patterns in place, shareholders’ rights in a 
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corporation may not be effectively protected.298Therefore, this section will also identify the 
patterns of enforcement in Nigeria, particularly highlighting enforcement errors, juridical 
approaches to statutory interpretation, court procedures and professional norms among 
lawyers that could impede effective enforcement. 
4.3.1.  Corporate Law Theory 
 
The corporate law theory of corporate finance propounds that countries with strong legal 
investor protections have more dispersed investments than countries with weak legal 
investor protections299or better said, that countries with weaker legal protection, have more 
concentrated ownership of equity and fewer minority shareholders in publicly-traded 
companies than countries with strong legal protections.300 The theory then predicts that 
countries with strong legal investor protections will likely have significantly larger equity 
markets than countries with poor investor protection301 as more investors, both small and 
large, will be convinced to invest bearing in mind that their rights and interests will be 
adequately protected especially with respect to the returns of their investments. 
Apart from the above logical reasoning and predictions, empirical studies have shown that 
countries with strong legal protection do have more dispersed shareholders than countries 
with weak investor protections.302 Research has also shown that countries with much 
stronger legal investor protections provide a much better environment in which securities 
markets can prosper and grow than countries with weak legal investor protections.303 For 
instance, La Porta et al’s research revealed that common law countries which had the 
strongest investor protections also had the highest average ratio of outsider held stock 
markets to Gross National Product (“GNP”) compared to civil law countries which had 
weak investor protection.304 Further research has also shown that strong legal protection of 
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minority shareholders against expropriation is correlated with a significant increase in 
valuable stock markets, more initial public offerings and a reduction in ownership 
concentration.305 
 
In view of the above research results, the corporate legal theory suggests that if the legal 
investor protections available under Nigerian law are stronger, small investors may feel 
more comfortable to invest in Nigerian companies and hence increase the size of capital 
markets in Nigeria, whereas where the legal investor protections are weak, such small 
investors may be put off or offer to pay prices so low that companies are discouraged from 
issuing at such prices. Alternatively, investors may only decide to invest when they are 
able to purchase concentrated ownership of shares in companies that could enable them to 
protect their rights and interests, and may as such, influence dispersed investments and 
growth of capital markets and the economy. 
 
La Porta et al’s research shows that, to a large extent, there is a strong correlation between 
weak investor protections and concentrated ownership of shares. In particular, French civil 
code countries, which had the weakest shareholders’ protections, were shown to have 
highly concentrated ownership of shares.306 One author has noted that “concentrated 
ownership emerges naturally when investor protection is weak”307 as the controlling 
shareholders may see the need to buy more shares in the company in order to closely 
monitor the activities of directors of the company and avoid being expropriated by them.308 
However, the level of investor protection and the degree of concentration of share 
ownership are not always correlated. The previous chapters of this thesis have highlighted 
Canada’s strong minority shareholders’ protection compared to the Nigerian minority 
shareholders’ protection. However, most publicly-traded corporations in Canada have 
concentrated ownership of shares.309Most publicly traded corporations in Nigeria are also 
                                                          
305
Djankov, S., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A, “The Law and Economics of Self-Dealing” 
(2008) 88:3, Journal of Financial Economics 430 at 466. 
306Ibid. 
307 Enrico Perotti& Ernst Thadden, “The Political Economy of Corporate Control and Labour Rents” (2006) 
114:1 J. Polit. Econ. 145 at 147. 
308La Porta et al, supra note 297 at 1145. 
309Walid Ben-Amar & Paul Andre, “Separation of Ownership from and Acquiring Firm Performance: The 
Case of Family Ownership in Canada” (2006) 33:3 Journal of Business Finance & Accounting 517 at 518. 
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held by a controlling shareholder that exercises significant control over the corporation. 
Recent statistics show that the average percentage for concentrated ownership of shares of 
the largest shareholders in the top 5 publicly-traded companies in Nigeria is 65.58%.310 
Although it has been argued in the previous chapters of this thesis that shareholder 
protections are stronger in Canada than in Nigeria, both Nigeria and Canada have 
concentrated ownership structures in most of their public corporations.  
 
The question that, therefore, arises is whether the Canadian minority shareholders’ 
protections are strong enough to trigger dispersed shareholdings in Canadian public 
corporations. In fact, the research conducted by La Porta et al shows that the Canadian 
corporate law system offers one of the strongest regimes of minority shareholders’ 
protection and rule of law mechanism among the common law countries examined, and 
common law systems were said to have the strongest investor protection rules among all  
the legal families.311 What this seems to suggest is that Canada’s public corporations’ 
ownership structure challenges the validity of the corporate law theory that provides that 
strong investor protections encourages dispersed shareholding in an economy. On the other 
hand, the Nigerian experience seems to be consistent with La Porta et al.’s theory since 
protection of minority shareholders of Nigerian corporations is weak, and the ownership 
of Nigerian top public corporations is highly concentrated. 
 
It is important to note that the corporate law theory is not the exclusive way of explaining 
differing corporate ownership structures in various jurisdictions. Other factors may also 
come into play that may trigger dispersed shareholdings or concentrated shareholdings, as 
the case may be. In fact, it has been argued that concentrated ownership of shares may arise 
not as a result of weak legal protections but because acquiring a controlling interest has 
been employed as a strategy to yield better monitoring of the management of the 
corporation. Concentrated ownership may also help to subsidize the cost of effective 
monitoring by offering the block shareholders the practical ability to “engage in forms of 
                                                          
310Available on the https://www.marketscreener.com at 11/20/19. 
311La Porta et al, supra note 303 at 1138. 
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self-dealing and insider trading that are anathema to market-centered systems of dispersed 
ownership”.312 
 
While it is clear from the above that the corporate legal theory does not explain all observed 
patterns in corporate ownership structures, nevertheless it is important to appreciate that 
minority shareholder protections play some role in making a jurisdiction attractive to 
investors as the research conducted by La Porta et al has shown, especially in a growing 
economy like Nigeria. Thus, although it would be an overly simplistic mistake to overstate 
the broad economic significance of strong minority shareholder protections, it is still 
pertinent to address differences in statutory investor protections, as well as strong 
enforcement in place as factors contributing at least to some extent to increased investment 
and economic development. Therefore, this thesis has focused on minority shareholders’ 
protection, acknowledging that this one particular factor is only part of a larger, complex 
set of factors affecting capital market developments, but also recognizing that it is equally 
important not to overlook this important factor in trying to ensure that there are no areas 
impeding investments in the Nigerian economy. 
 
4.3.2. Enforcement as a substitute for weak minority shareholders’ protection 
 
La Porta et al initially advanced the proposition that a strong system of legal enforcement 
could substitute for weak legal minority shareholders' rules since an effective judiciary can 
step in to provide remedies for minority shareholders where their rights have been 
violated.313 However, their study has shown that this prediction is not what occurs in the 
corporate world and that legal protection and strong enforcement usually co-exist as 
opposed to one being a substitute for the other. To address this point, La Porta et al 
examined proxies for the quality of enforcement of minority shareholders’ rights, namely 
– measures of “law and order” in different countries compiled by private credit risk 
agencies for foreign investors interested in doing business in respective 
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jurisdictions.314They examined among other factors the efficiency of the judicial system, 
the rule of law and corruption in the various countries. In particular, the aggregate of 
common law countries seems to outperform the aggregate of French civil law countries 
(which have weak legal protections) on all measures of rule of law.315 Thus, this research 
suggests that enforcement is not a substitute for weak investor protection but that legal 
protection for shareholders can only be effective where there are both strong legal 
provisions and enforcement by the courts and regulators, as the case may be.  
 
More recent studies have also analyzed the effect of judicial efficiency on a country’s 
ability to attract investments, most especially foreign investments.316It has also been 
revealed that most foreign investors structure their international investments based on a 
country’s characteristics, with judicial efficiency being one of the foremost.317 This is 
mainly because even where there are well-designed laws, there is a greater need for the 
courts to enforce the provisions and protect investors’ rights expeditiously. These studies 
make it clear that the two factors - strong legal provisions and judicial enforcement- co-
exist probably because the courts will usually not provide remedies that are outside of what 
is stipulated in the statutes. Thus, just like statutory provisions, the efficiency of the 
judiciary and other enforcement institutions are key to improving investment levels in an 
economy and perhaps economic development.318 
As noted by North:319 
Indeed, the difficulty of creating a relatively impartial judicial system that 
enforces agreements has been a critical stumbling block in the path of 
economic development. In the western world the evolution of courts, legal 
systems, and a relatively impartial system of judicial enforcement has played 
a major role in permitting the development of a complex system of 
                                                          
314Ibid at 1140. 
315Ibid. 
316Gwendolyn G Ball & Jay P Kesan, “Judges, Courts and Economic Development: the Impact of Judicial 
Human Capital on the Efficiency and Accuracy of the Court System” (2010) (unpublished manuscript), 
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317Ibid. 
318Increase in Investment levels is simply the increase of money brought into the company for profit or 
material result. Economic development on the other hand, is the process by which the economic well-being 
and quality of life of a nation, region or local community are improved. 
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contracting that can extend over time and space, an essential requirement for 
economic specialization 
 
While it has been argued that adequate minority investor protections can improve 
investments which may eventually lead to an improved economy,320 it is important to note 
at this point that adequate minority investor protections do not automatically mean that 
there will be improved investments in the economy, nor does a dispersed shareholding 
structure such as that associated with publicly-traded corporations in the US and the U.K 
equate to higher investment levels or a more developed economy.321 Also, additional or 
more adequate minority shareholders’ protections are not a panacea for a nation’s 
economic problems. In fact, it can be argued that the improvement of minority 
shareholders’ protection is only a small piece of a wide-ranging set of solutions that may 
be required in order to generate economic development in a complex system. However, 
earlier research conducted by LaPorta et al has shown that there is a strong correlation 
between strong legal provisions and enforcement and investment levels and economic 
development. Roe, a strong political theorist, admits the importance of legal provisions in 
economic development: 
 I have not denied the value of strong corporate law that protects distant 
stockholders nor denigrated its usefulness in building efficacious business 
enterprises, nor refuted its academic utility in explaining some key aspects of 
corporate differences around the world, especially in transition and third 
world nations.322 
4.3.3. Practical Enforcement Obstacles 
 
As highlighted above, there are a few significant differences in the Canadian and Nigerian 
statutory provisions relating to the derivative action and oppression remedy. However, 
most of the statutory provisions are somewhat similar especially because of the initial 
sources of both corporate laws – English law. The question that arises is what makes the 
Canadian minority shareholders’ protection different from what is obtainable under 
                                                          
320La Porta et al, supra note 297 at 1115. 
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and concentrated ownership of shares and yet have good economies. 
322Mark J Roe, Political Determinants of Corporate Governance (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2003) at 194. 
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Nigerian minority shareholders’ protection. The answer appears to be enforcement patterns 
in Nigeria. These enforcement patterns reflect the attitudes and approaches that the courts 
adopt in interpreting the provisions of the statutes, the delays in delivering judgments, and 
different court procedures, to mention a few. 
 
For instance, the Nigerian courts have continued to adopt a common law approach in 
interpreting the provisions of CAMA relating to the derivative action and oppression 
remedy provisions. As highlighted in chapter 2 of this thesis, the Nigerian courts will 
usually dismiss any application not brought under the required mode set out in the 
Companies Proceeding Rules even though the application shows proof of the conditions to 
be satisfied. The Canadian courts, on the other hand, have expressly pronounced in 
accordance with the rules of civil procedure that the court will not set an application aside 
simply because it was instituted in the wrong procedural mode. The Canadian courts have 
also emphasized that although it partly originated from English common law, the current 
Canadian law no longer reflects the attitude underlying the old common law rule.323No 
doubt, textual differences in the Canadian legislative provision also aid the Canadian courts 
in making such flexible pronouncements. Nevertheless, the Nigerian courts could apply 
their discretion and adopt a more flexible approach pending legislative amendment in order 
to simplify the procedure for minority shareholders who want to apply for a derivative 
action on behalf of the corporation.  
 
With respect to the oppression remedy, even though the Canadian and Nigerian oppression 
remedy provisions are very similar, the Canadian courts have provided a broader 
interpretation to cover “reasonable expectations” of parties even where such expectations 
are not set out in legal documents. Nigerian courts have yet to establish any guidelines for 
exercising their judicial discretion of the sort that have evolved under the Canadian 
corporate legal system. The Nigerian courts examine the facts of each case and simply go 
straight to pronouncing whether or not the oppression remedy will apply without providing 
any form of guidelines or analysis that can create some level of certainty in the Nigerian 
minority shareholders’ protection regime. 
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Apart from the manner in which the Nigerian courts interpret the statutory scope of the 
derivative action and oppression remedy, there is also the issue of the effectiveness of the 
judiciary in adequately enforcing the provisions of CAMA. Just as highlighted by La Porta 
et al, the importance of an effective judiciary cannot be overemphasized in adequately 
protecting shareholders. In other words, apart from ensuring that the Nigerian statutory 
investor protections are strong, there is need for an effective judiciary in place to enforce 
the statutory provisions. However, the effectiveness of the judicial system has been 
questioned in recent times especially in light of the delay in judicial proceedings caused by 
unnecessary adjournments orchestrated by the lawyers and even judges. In some instances, 
the judges are overburdened with cases they are required to hear weekly, thereby making 
them cancel on some when they feel overstretched. This is because the registrar may have 
fixed too many cases on a particular day without informing the judge simply because the 
registrar cannot turn down applications of lawyers who will prefer a particular date, which 
will not be convenient for the court.324 The lawyers also sometimes pressure these registrars 
or even offer bribes in order to get a certain date which may not be convenient for the court. 
Consequently, the judges have no option other than to adjourn when there are too many 
cases to be heard on a day that is inconvenient for the court. In some other instances, the 
delay is caused primarily by the legal practitioner who may be purposely requesting for 
adjournments where he is unprepared or believes his case is not likely to come out 
positively. In such cases, he may feel the need to keep requesting for such adjournments. 
If granted by the courts, these adjournments may frustrate the other party and perhaps even 
lead the other party to drop the matter.325Even though this is against the Nigerian rules of 
professional conduct for lawyers, many legal practitioners have continued these practices 
thereby causing unnecessary delays in proceedings, probably because there are not obvious 
consequences for these actions. 
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In Nigeria, statistics have shown that the average period to begin and conclude litigation is 
about six to ten years.326Recent statistics also show that in the beginning of the 2018/2019 
legal year, 191,766 cases were still pending at the Federal High Court (the court bestowed 
with the jurisdiction to handle company-related matters)327across its various divisions in 
Nigeria.328These statistics could be very discouraging to a minority shareholder who is 
seeking a remedy as such shareholder may have fears of spending several years in court 
while also incurring significant legal costs. At the margins, prospective investors 
conducting due diligence on the Nigerian legal system before investing may be put off by 
the estimated timeline for obtaining a remedy in the event that a breach has occurred. 
Conversely, if litigation processes were known to be timely and efficient, the threat of 
effective enforcement of minority shareholders’ rights could deter corporate management 
and other stakeholders from abusing minority shareholders’ rights, especially where such 
parties may predict that the court will speedily protect the minority shareholders’ rights.329 
 
Generally, many have argued that perhaps relying more on regulators to settle investment-
related disputes will make the legal system more effective especially because some judges 
do not understand the issues revolving around law and investments.330Regulators, on the 
other hand, tend to be more knowledgeable about securities and investments generally and 
understand the impact these sectors have on the Nigerian economy and as such understand 
the urgency required in resolving investment disputes. However, under Nigerian law these 
regulators such as the Commission and the Investment Securities Tribunal only have 
limited jurisdictions over certain investment disputes,331 leaving most of the enforcement 
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of minority shareholders protections available under CAMA to the courts. Therefore, it is 
important that the Nigerian government seeks to ensure that courts speedily apply the 
statutory provisions where investors’ rights and interests have been violated.  
 
Even though the legislative provisions relating to the derivative action and oppression 
remedy under the CBCA and CAMA are very similar, the above factors may be responsible 
for the different outcomes in the protection of minority shareholders under the respective 
jurisdictions in addition to the difference in their statutory provisions. Other factors may 
also be responsible for the difference in their outcomes. However, it is the hope that the 
courts would consider granting adjournments sparingly especially where such 
adjournments are simply used as a delay-tactic by the defendants in an investor-related 
dispute. Furthermore, it is important that policymakers make conscious efforts to reduce 
the delays in the attainment of the minority shareholders’ remedies by setting specific 
timelines within which the courts should decide investor remedy related cases. The fact 
that a simple derivative action case today could last between 2-3 years before being 
disposed does not speak well of the Nigerian legal system and makes a mockery of the 
government’s commitment to ensure increase of investments in the Nigerian economy.   
Conclusion 
 
This chapter highlights the differences in the legislative provisions and interpretation of 
the courts of the derivative action and oppression remedy under the CBCA and CAMA. It 
reveals that there are not many significant statutory differences between the provisions in 
each jurisdiction but the difference in protection of minority shareholders appears to lie in 
the judicial approaches to statutory interpretation and patterns of enforcement. It also 
briefly highlights the connection between corporate law and enforcement and ownership 
structures in corporations and economic development, while also acknowledging that there 
are other factors that may significantly trigger dispersed investments and economic 
development. As Roe rightly noted, there can be more than one theory that explains the 
variation in corporate structures. Therefore, it is important that the various pitfalls available 
under each theory be addressed in order to ensure that economic growth is facilitated from 
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all angles. The focus in this thesis is upon inadequacies typically under corporate law 
statutory provisions and in enforcement patterns. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
98 
 
 
Chapter 5: Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this research was to examine the minority shareholders' protection available 
under the Canadian and Nigerian corporate legal systems, focusing specifically on 
the derivative action and oppression remedy. The reason for this, as highlighted in chapter 
3 of this thesis, is that the derivative action and oppression remedy are the two most 
important remedies currently available under corporate law, with the latter being described 
by a Canadian author as “the broadest, most comprehensive and most open-ended remedy 
in the common-law world”.332 The derivative action, which is a remedy obtained for 
wrongs done to a corporation is also a vital tool used in protecting minority shareholders 
because a wrong done to a corporation may consequently affect shareholders’ rights and 
interests.  In assessing these remedies, the primary sources of law considered in the two 
jurisdictions were statutes namely, CAMA, which is applicable to all companies 
incorporated in Nigeria, and the CBCA, applicable only to federally incorporated business 
organizations in Canada.  Apart from these statutes, another key source of law examined 
in this thesis was case law from Nigeria and Canada and some historically relevant English 
law cases. 
 
This thesis highlights, in a comparative style, how Canadian and Nigerian corporate laws 
protect minority shareholders’ corporate and personal rights and how the courts in their 
respective jurisdictions interpret and implement these statutory provisions. The objective 
is to re-emphasize the importance of having a strong mechanism in place such that when 
corporate-related issues and disputes arise, minority shareholders who are investors are not 
left without adequate remedy. This research further highlights the differences in the 
legislative provisions and interpretation of the courts of the derivative action and 
oppression remedy under the CBCA and CAMA. It reveals that there are not many 
significant differences between the statutory provisions in the two jurisdictions but 
important differences appear to lie in the judicial approaches to statutory interpretation and 
patterns of enforcement. It also emphasizes the importance of not only strong statutory 
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provisions but also adequate implementation of those provisions. For the government, it is 
important that these laws adequately protect both local and foreign investors so as to 
encourage prospective investors or current investors to invest more which may in turn 
increase investment levels in the economy. 
 
This thesis presents to prospective investors, legal personnel, and government agencies 
responsible for policymaking in both jurisdictions a clear picture of the fundamental 
protections available to shareholders, particularly minority shareholders in the corporation. 
It further reveals the attitudes of the courts in the respective jurisdictions in interpreting 
statutory provisions protecting the rights and interests of the minority shareholders.  
 
While it has been argued that the legal factors affecting shareholders’ rights are not all that 
is required to increase investments and that they are perhaps only a small piece of a wide 
range of factors necessary for increase in investments, it is well settled that there is some 
connection between the level of investment and minority shareholder protections.333This 
thesis not only provided a comparison of the derivative action and oppression remedy under 
Nigerian and Canadian corporate law, which will be of great assistance to the legislators, 
but also highlighted the significance of strong statutory provisions and enforcement in 
order to encourage investments. This is a crucial point for the future development of the 
Nigerian economy, but more importantly it is also an opportunity for Nigeria’s legislators 
to act fast and review the archaic Nigerian corporate legal provisions and for Nigerian 
courts to adopt the approach taken by the Canadian courts in interpreting the derivative 
action and oppression remedy. It is further suggested that this research be used as a 
foundation for further research in the field of corporate minority shareholder remedies as 
well as for enforcement reforms, especially in Nigeria where the Nigerian government is 
currently reviewing legislation and developing mechanisms that can stimulate a significant 
economic reform. It is hoped that this thesis will help to advance this journey. 
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